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DEFINED TERMS
Although only three countries are addressed in this paper, the dis-
cussion implicates the common and statutory law of more than 50
American states, districts and territories, all of the Canadian provinces,
and England, as well as the national or federal law of each country.
The law of these jurisdictions is expressed in different terms. In order
to minimize the confusion caused by these differing terms, certain key
terms are employed throughout this paper. For ease of reference, those
terms are listed and defined here:
CONSERVATION (or SUPERVISION) - the procedure whereby the
receiver takes possession of an insurer or reinsurer's assets, business,
and affairs to conserve them for the benefit of the company's creditors.
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DOMESTIC - the forum jurisdiction under consideration. FOR-
EIGN refers to all other jurisdictions.
DOMICILIARY - the jurisdiction in which the troubled company
was organized. ANCILLARY refers to any other jurisdiction.
INSOLVENT, DEBTOR, TROUBLED, or DELINQUENT company -
the insurance or reinsurance company which finds itself undergoing
some type of regulatory proceeding.
INSURANCE COMPANY - a company transacting the business of
insurance and/or reinsurance.
LIQUIDATION - marshalling and distribution of a company's as-
sets; precludes the transaction of further business by the company.
RECEIVER, TRUSTEE, ADMINISTRATOR, REHABILITATOR, or LIQ-
UIDATOR - the person appointed to reorganize or liquidate the affairs
of an insolvent company.
REGULATORY PROCEEDING - the administrative or judicial pro-
cess by which an insolvent insurance company is conserved, reorga-
nized, rehabilitated or liquidated.
REHABILITATION - the preservation, whenever possible, of the
business of an insurance company threatened with insolvency.
UNIVERSALITY - the conflict of laws theory which has as its pre-
cept that all disputes should be resolved in a single forum. TERRITORI-
ALITY refers to its opposite, which accords no extraterritorial effect to
the laws or judgments of a foreign country.
INTRODUCTION
A major multinational institution becomes insolvent. Panic spreads
among the institution's customers and creditors. While the institution's
owners struggle to preserve assets intact for the benefit of all creditors,
local creditors of the company quickly try to appropriate local assets.
Although it sounds like a story from today's front page headlines,
the institution involved was the Ammanati Bank of Pistoja, Italy, and
the year was 1302.1 Fortunately for the bank and its creditors, Pope
Boniface VII used his considerable influence to persuade the owners of
the bank to cooperate in an effort to preserve assets, and used local
clergy throughout affected European countries to collect funds from the
bank's debtors. Thus, the Holy See achieved what otherwise would
have been impossible for a trustee or receiver- collecting assets for dis-
tribution across national borders.
1 See Nadelmann, Bankruptcy Treaties, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 58 (1944) (citing
Fliniaux, La Faillite Des Ammanati De Pistoie et le Saint-Siege, NOUVELLE REVUE
HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANCAIS ET ETRANGER 436 (1924)).
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Today, nearly 700 years later, multistate and multinational insol-
Vencies still pose special problems and challenges. No single entity akin
to the Papacy of the Middle Ages exists today that can effect a multina-
tional collection and distribution of the assets of a debtor company. In-
stead, each country has its own laws for dealing with the insolvency of
entities such as financial institutions and insurance companies.
Most jurisdictions seek to distribute the assets of a debtor company
among its creditors in an expeditious, economical and equitable manner
by appointing a single liquidator. However, when a debtor company
has assets and creditors located around the world, is it preferable that
the debtor's assets be the subject of adjudication in only one jurisdiction,
or should concurrent insolvency proceedings be instituted in several ju-
risdictions? Since the 19th century, the two principal approaches to an-
swering this question have been embodied in the territoriality and
universality (or "doctrine of unity") theories of conflict of laws.
2
The two theories support quite different approaches to answering
such questions. The territoriality theory in its purest form does not rec-
ognize extraterritorial effects of any country's laws. A debtor company
with assets situated around the world must be liquidated in separate,
concurrent proceedings in each territory in which its assets are located,
according to the laws of that territory. Domestic creditors prove their
claims in domestic proceedings and domestic assets are distributed with-
out regard to other proceedings taking place elsewhere. The territorial-
ity theory has been criticized because the administration of separate
proceedings in each territory is expensive and because creditors in one
2 Note that in In re Artola Hermanos, Ex parte Andre Chale 24 Q.B.D. 640
(1890), Fry, L.J., considered three such theories. The three theories were described as
follows:
One of these [theories] is this, that where there are concurrent bankrupt-
cies each forum is to administer the assets locally situated within its juris-
diction, each forum of course allowing all the creditors, wherever resident,
to prove but applying the doctrine of hotchpot so as to produce, so far as
may be, equality between the proofs of the various creditors .... Another
[theory] is this, that every other forum shall yield to the forum of the
domicil, that the forum of every foreign country, every country not of the
domicil, shall act only as accessory and in aid of the forum of the domicil.
That, it is said, is the forum concursus, to which all persons who are
interested in the administration of the estate are bound to have recourse.
No doubt there is a great deal in point of law and principle to be said in
favour of that view, and there are certainly some conveniences in it ...
Then there is a third [theory] and it is this, that the forum of the country
in which the debtor has assets and which first adjudicates him bankrupt,
although it be not the forum of the domicil, is entitled to claim the assets
from the tribunals of other countries in which he has assets.
Fry, L.J. recognized the third theory as being entirely unreasonable. The first two
theories are similar to the territoriality and universality theories hereinafter discussed.
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territory may be paid a greater portion of their debts than like creditors
in other territories, thereby violating the fundamental insolvency princi-
ple that creditors should be treated equally. In addition, this theory is
increasingly criticized at a time when international cooperation is val-
ued and pursued.' However, separate, concurrent proceedings in differ-
ent jurisdictions may be preferable if the debtor company conducts such
different types of business in each jurisdiction that it is more practicable
to liquidate the businesses separately.4
The universality theory supports the view that domiciliary liqui-
dation proceedings should be recognized worldwide. In its purest form,
the universality theory recognizes that the "domiciliary" liquidator
must recover the debtor company's assets wherever they may be, and
remove them to the domiciliary jurisdiction.5 All creditors of the debtor
company must prove their claims in the domiciliary proceedings. The
universality theory affords equal treatment of creditors and promotes
international administration of law and justice. However, the theory is
criticized because foreign creditors have to suffer the inconvenience and
hardship of proving their claims in foreign liquidation proceedings.
This paper does not focus on the practical problems liquidators experi-
ence in cross-border insolvencies.6 Rather, it addresses the responses of
3 Milligan-Whyte, Smith and Lewis, Transnational Aspects of Insurance and
Reinsurance Insolvencies: An Introductory Overview of Selected Issues From Bermu-
dian, American and English Perspectives, 1989 A.B.A. Sec. Tort & Ins. Practice, Law
and Practice of Insurance Company Insolvency Revisited 1071, 1145 [hereinafter
Transnational Aspects].
4 Id. at 1147.
5 See Fletcher, International Conference Report: Cross-border Insolvency, 2 In-
solvency Intelligence 75 (1989).
There was general agreement [at the 1989 colloquium held at Aber-
ystwyth University under the auspices of the United Kingdom National
Committee of Comparative Law] that it is unrealistic to suppose that any
principle of universality of bankruptcy can be attained at the global, nor
possibly even at a regional, level in the foreseeable future. The differences
between the individual national laws are such that it will continue to be a
matter of insistence that certain interests and expectations arising under
local law shall not be overridden by the effects of insolvency proceedings
which take place elsewhere.
Id. Also see the December 1988 Law Reform Commission of Australia report entitled
"General Insolvency Inquiry" in which Professor Dr. Hans Hanisch of Geneva Uni-
versity stated that "[t]he advantages of the unity principle seems to me to be overesti-
mated. This principle in its strict sense is too idealistic taking into account the (often)
wide gap of differences in a more 'global' view of laws concerned."
6 A few of the obvious difficulties with which liquidators must contend include:
having little or no familiarity with laws of foreign jurisdictions; the failure of local
courts to recognize the authority of foreign representatives; and the necessity to mini-
mize costs and fees while marshalling and distributing the debtor corporation's world-
wide assets as quickly as possible. For a good discussion of some of the practical
problems of cross-border insolvencies, see Mackay, Practical Problems of Cross Fron-
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the United States, England and Canada to some of the complex legal
issues arising in cross-border insolvencies, such as the conflicting pow-
ers and duties of liquidators appointed in different jurisdictions to mar-
shal and distribute worldwide assets of the debtor corporation, and the
relative rights of domestic and foreign creditors to lay claims to those
assets. In particular, these issues are examined with reference to cross-
border insolvencies of insurance and reinsurance companies.
1. UNITED STATES LAW
The law of the United States is both universalist and territorialist
in approach, reflecting the federal form of government. While the fed-
eral Constitution provides principles of universal application to the
states, the states act as independent sovereigns with respect to matters
entrusted to their care. Thus, in the United States, the regulation of
insurance and reinsurance companies is the responsibility of the several
states.' That is, there are fifty-three' different sets of statutes and regu-
lations governing insurance companies, instead of a single set of federal
statutes and regulations. Which set of regulations applies to the admin-
istration of a particular troubled insurance or reinsurance company de-
pends on where the company is domiciled. This system is not as confus-
ing or territorialist as it may first appear, however, as the laws of the
various states are similar or identical in many respects, owing largely to
efforts over the years to create uniform laws.9 One of these laws, which
contains provisions governing multistate receiverships, is the Uniform
Insurers Liquidation Act. The majority of states have adopted some
version of this law.
tier Insolvency (1985); Cooper, Location, Preservation and Recovery of Assets, The
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Cross Border Insolvency,
Problems and Legal Principles (1986).
' See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1988) (regulation of insurance is the province of the
several states); 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), (3), (d) (1988) (insurance companies excluded as
debtors from federal bankruptcy proceedings). The states have the authority to regulate,
supervise and control insurance companies from the time of their foundation to the time
of their dissolution. State ex rel. Dirks v. Capitol Sec. Life Ins. Co., 84 S.D. 595, 174
N.W.2d 212, 213 (1970).
8 This number includes the fifty states, the District of Columbia and the United
States territories of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
' The National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") is the primary
organization that today attempts to create for the various states uniform law and policy
in the area of insurance company insolvency through the creation and promotion of
legislation and regulations which are designed to serve as models for state statutes and
codes.
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1.1. The Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act
As insurance companies with multistate (or multinational) assets
and liabilities have become more the rule than the exception in the
United States, uniformity in the laws governing the insolvency proceed-
ings for these companies has become increasingly important in order to
insure economic, equitable and expeditious administration. The Uni-
form Insurers Liquidation Act ("UILA"), approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1939,1" is a
statute designed to deal with the problems of administering troubled
insurance companies which have assets and liabilities in more than one
state. Currently, 30 states have adopted some form of the UILA."
1.1.1. Background and Purpose of the UILA
The UILA was enacted in response to the economic depression
experienced in the United States in the late 1920s and 30s. The depres-
sion resulted in the forced liquidation or reorganization of numerous
insurance companies, and the ensuing receivership proceedings were
plagued by many problems. For example, in many instances, states
would not recognize receivership proceedings for a particular company
ongoing in a different state, and disputes arose as to the title and right
of possession of the troubled company's assets. This confusion caused
dissipation of the company's assets and frequently enabled debtors in
certain states to avoid meeting their obligations.' 2 Further problems
arose from differences in state law concerning the filing of claims, the
definition of preferences, and the priorities of creditors' claims."3
The drafters of the UILA 4 felt that a general adoption of the
UILA would "greatly facilitate proceedings commenced for the liquida-
tion, rehabilitation or reorganization of insurance companies and . . .
provide for the equitable distribution of the assets of defunct insur-
ers."' 5 Reflecting a universalist approach, the statute was designed spe-
cifically for insurance insolvencies and to address "problems peculiar to
10 Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act, 13 U.L.A. 321, 328-53 (Master ed. 1986).
See Appendix A.
12 Prefatory Note to the UILA, 13 U.L.A. at 322 [hereinafter "Prefatory Note"].
'3 See G.C. Murphy Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co.; 54 N.Y.2d 69, 429 N.E.2d 111,
114-15, 444 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1981) (listing the six "embarrassments" that the UILA was
designed to eliminate).
' The UILA was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws after collaboration with the Insurance Law Section of the American
Bar Association, the NAIC, the insurance departments of several states, and certain
other qualified authorities. Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. at 323.
15 Id.
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the liquidation of business having assets and liabilities distributed in
two or more states."'" Specifically,
the greater number of [the assets of insurance companies]
naturally have their situs in the state of domicile of the com-
pany, but a substantial portion is normally scattered over the
entire territory within which the company carries on its bus-
iness .... [Tihe liabilities of insurance companies, consisting
primarily of policy obligations, are also distributed over the
several states in which the companies do business. This wide
distribution of assets and liabilities creates a formidable ar-
ray of problems when liquidation, rehabilitation or reorgani-
zation proceedings become necessary for an insurer which
has drifted into financial difficulties.'
7
Thus, the purpose of the UILA is to provide a uniform and equitable
method of preserving, making and processing claims against a defunct
insurer, and to provide a fair, orderly and efficient procedure to dis-
tribute the assets of that insurer, so as to protect the interests of the
company's owners, policyholders and creditors, as well as the public."5
Specifically, the UILA is designed to secure equal treatment for all
parties affected by an insurance insolvency, wherever those parties may
be situated.' 9
1.1.2. Structure of the UILA
Under the UILA, the receivership or insolvency proceeding itself
is referred to as a "delinquency proceeding," and defined as "any pro-
ceeding commenced against an insurer for the purpose of liquidating,
rehabilitating, reorganizing or conserving" a delinquent insurer.2" The
Act designates the various states that may be involved in any given de-
16 Id. at 322.
17 Id.
" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Directors of Wis. Ins. Sec. Fund, 572 F.
Supp. 460 (W.D. Wis. 1983); Vlasaty v. Avco Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d
928, 304 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
19 Springer v. Colburn, 162 So.2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1964). As one court noted, the
UILA was enacted in part to prevent attempts by local creditors to seize the assets of a
foreign insurer. Ace Grain Co. v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 80, 82
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 199 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1952).
Although the UILA does not specifically mention reinsurance companies, it has
been applied to reinsurance companies, as well as their contracts and property.
" UILA § 1(2). A company need not be insolvent to be the subject of a delin-
quency proceeding. Ace Grain Co. v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 80, 83
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (business of the company was carried on by receiver during delin-
quency proceedings).
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linquency proceeding as follows:
DOMICILIARY STATE - the state in which the insurance
company is incorporated or organized. If the insurer is incor-
porated or organized in a foreign country, then the domicili-
ary state is deemed to be the state in which that insurance
company has, at the beginning of the delinquency proceed-
ings, "the largest amount of its assets held in trust and assets
held on deposit for the benefit of its policyholders or policy-
holders and creditors in the United States. '2 1 The domicili-
ary state is deemed to be the primary location for the delin-
quency proceedings.
ANCILLARY STATE - any state other than a domiciliary
state. Ancillary states are those states where ancillary pro-
ceedings, i.e., delinquency proceedings parallel to those of
the domiciliary state, may be instituted, because assets of the
delinquent company are located there.
RECIPROCAL STATE - any state in which the substance of
the UILA has been enacted.22
The UILA defines certain types of assets2" and claims involved in
delinquency proceedings. "General assets" are defined as "all property,
real, personal or otherwise, not specifically mortgaged, pledged, depos-
ited or otherwise encumbered for the security or benefit of specified
persons or a limited class or classes of persons."'2 4 Assets situated in a
state other than the domiciliary state are not exempt from classification
as general assets by virtue of their location. Assets held in trust or on
deposit in an ancillary state for the benefit of all the insolvent's policy-
holders are deemed to be general assets.25 Also, reinsurance proceeds
21 UILA § 1(5). See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Northumberland Gen. Ins.
Co., 617 F. Supp. 88, 89 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Illinois action dismissed where delinquency
proceedings for a Canadian company were ongoing in New York).
22 UILA § 1(7). To be considered reciprocal states within the meaning of the
UILA, each state's wording and interpretation of the provisions of the UILA need not
be identical. Twin City Bank v. Mutual Fire Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 646 F. Supp.
1139, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Murphy v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 195 N.J. Super. 274,
478 A.2d 1243, 1248 (1984); but see Alabama Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Gammill, 18 Ariz.
App. 575, 504 P.2d 516, 520 (1972) (states were deemed to be non-reciprocal where
there were "material differences" between the statutes of the states).
2 "Insurance company assets take the form, for the most part, of special deposits
required by state law, balances in the hands of insurance agents, policy premiums due
but unpaid, and investments of reserve funds." Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. at 322.
24 UILA § 1(8).
25 See, e.g., In re Liquidation of Union Indem. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 132 Misc. 2d
102, 104, 502 N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (assets held in trust and on deposit
for security of all policyholders are general assets); Fletcher v. State Treasurer, 16
Mich. App. 87, 167 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1969) (securities deposited by an insurance
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typically are deemed to be general assets.26
"Special deposit claims" are defined as any claims which have
been secured by a deposit, made pursuant to a statute, for the security
or benefit of a limited class of persons. Most states have statutes -
designed to protect state residents against foreign insurance companies
- that require an insurance or reinsurance company to post funds in
the form of a "special deposit" with the state before being allowed to do
business in that state. These special deposits can take the form of
bonds, trust accounts, escrow accounts, letters of credit, cash, or any
other form of security approved or required by the state. The states
usually require funds in an amount more than sufficient to cover all
potential outstanding policyholder (and in some states, general creditor)
claims against the insurance company by the residents of that state. In
some states, the amount and form of the deposit is dependent upon the
type of insurer involved and the type of insurance risk underwritten. "
The substantive provisions of the UILA create a framework for
simultaneous delinquency proceedings in different states with respect to
a single delinquent insurance company.29 The UILA outlines proce-
dures for delinquency proceedings for both domiciliary and non-domi-
company with the state treasurer for the benefit of all policyholders were general as-
sets). Generally, if the assets are held in trust for all United States policyholders, the
assets will be deemed general assets. If the assets in a particular state are held in trust
for only the policyholders of that state, however, the assets will not be deemed general
assets.
26 See State ex rel. Low v. Imperial Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 426, 682 P.2d 431, 437
(Ct. App. 1984). Accord Excess & Casualty Reins. Ass'n v. Insurance Comm'r of Cal.,
656 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1981); American Re-Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r of Cal.,
527 F. Supp. 444, 453 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Skandia America Reins. Corp. v. Barnes, 458
F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Colo. 1978); Florida ex rel. O'Malley v. Department of Ins., 155
Ind. App. 168, 291 N.E.2d 907, 913 (1973).
1 As one court noted, the term "special deposit" under the UILA was intended to
mean "security deposits exacted from a foreign insurer as a condition precedent to do-
ing business in a State for purposes of providing a general fund for the protection of
resident policyholders." G.C. Murphy Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 54 N.Y.2d 69, 429
N.E.2d 111, 113 n.2, 444 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1981).
26 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 757 (special deposit requirements gen-
erally), para. 638 (domestic stock companies), para. 686 (reciprocals), para. 709
(Lloyds underwriters) (West Supp. 1990).
The UILA also defines "preferred" and "secured" claims. Preferred claims are
any claims to which a state or the United States accords priority of payment from
general assets. UILA § 1(9). Secured claims are claims secured by a mortgage, trust,
deposit, pledge, etc., as well as claims which became liens upon specific assets of the
company more than four months prior to the commencement of delinquency proceed-
ings in the domiciliary state. UILA § 1(11); see Joplin Corp. v. State ex rel. Grimes,
570 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Okla. 1977) (where creditor took judgment against insurance
company less than four months prior to the commencement of delinquency proceedings,
the claim of the creditor was not a "secured" claim within the meaning of the UILA).
2" The provisions of the UILA must be construed as a whole. Martin v. General
Am. Casualty Co., 226 La. 481, 76 So.2d 537, 542 (1954).
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ciliary insurance companies, as well as the duties and responsibilities of
the domiciliary and ancillary receivers.30 The UILA also sets forth pro-
visions governing the filing and proving of claims, priority of creditors'
claims, special deposits, and the attachment and garnishment of assets.
Overall, these provisions centralize the delinquency proceedings by
vesting power in a single domiciliary receiver. This centralization re-
flects the universalist policy underpinnings of the UILA: in order to
administer a multistate insolvency most effectively and consistently, one
state and one receiver must be given primary control, and that receiver
will use his power to assure fair and equitable treatment of all the
company's creditors, wherever located.
1.1.3. Domiciliary and Ancillary Receivers
Delinquency proceedings may be initiated against an insurance
company in the United States for a number of reasons, such as insol-
vency, failure to maintain proper books and records, refusal to submit
to examination or inspection by state insurance authorities, or posing a
risk to policyholders. 3" Delinquency proceedings usually are carried out
under the supervision of a designated state court, and often proceed
according to some sort of court-approved plan of administration.
a. Appointment of State Receivers
Once delinquency proceedings are initiated in the state where a
delinquent company is domiciled, the UILA provides that the court
shall designate the commissioner 2 of insurance for the state as the
domiciliary receiver. 3 Most states have requirements outlining the spe-
cific method by which the receiver is to be appointed. "'
Some courts have held that an ancillary receiver cannot be ap-
pointed until after a domiciliary receiver has been appointed. 5 In any
'0 A "receiver" under the UILA is defined as a "receiver, liquidator, rehabilitator
or conservator, as the context may require." UILA § 1(12).
31 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 800 (West Supp. 1990) (listing grounds
for rehabilitation and liquidation of a domestic company).
11 Also referred to as the "director" or "superintendent" of insurance.
s3 UILA § 2(1) ("Whenever under the laws of this state a receiver is to be ap-
pointed in delinquency proceedings ... the court shall appoint the [insurance commis-
sioner] as such receiver.").
The judge of the supervising court has no power to appoint herself as receiver of
the-delinquent company in a delinquency proceeding. See, e.g., State ex rel Hunt v.
Green, 508 P.2d 639, 642 (Okla. 1973).
"I See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 813 (West Supp. 1990) (state Attorney
General petitions for appointment of receiver).
'5 See, e.g., Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Ins., 400 So. 2d
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event, unless steps are taken under the statute to appoint an ancillary
receiver, an ancillary receiver cannot be deemed to exist simply by vir-
tue of the fact that assets of the insolvent company are situated in an
ancillary state. 6 The commissioner of insurance must petition the court
for appointment of an ancillary receiver (i) if there are "sufficient" as-
sets of the company located in the ancillary state to justify the appoint-
ment of an ancillary receiver, or (ii) if ten or more state residents peti-
tion the commissioner requesting an ancillary receiver.17 The UILA
provides that the court shall appoint the insurance commissioner of the
state as ancillary receiver. 8 Of course, if there are no assets of a com-
pany in a particular state, there is no basis for appointment of an ancil-
lary receiver in that state. 9
b. Appointment of Federal Receivers
In the unusual circumstance that no state commissioner can be
found to assume the responsibility of conducting delinquency proceed-
ings for a particular company, a federal receiver may be appointed,
although the UILA does not specifically provide for such an alternative.
In Inland Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed,40 an Idaho domiciled insurance
company with its principal place of business in Utah was sued by a
contract creditor, who alleged that the company was insolvent. The
Idaho commissioner of insurance was appointed by the court as re-
ceiver. The commissioner objected to his appointment, alleging that be-
cause most of the assets of the company were beyond the jurisdictional
reach of Idaho courts, he was unable to rehabilitate the company in
Idaho. He suggested appointment of a federal court receiver and the
receiver of the company in Utah supported his request.
The delinquent insurance company objected, contending that state
laws provided for the appointment of commissioners and the conduct of
delinquency proceedings in each state, and that a federal receiver was
813, 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
36 See, e.g., Springer v. Colburn, 162 So. 2d 513, 516 (Fla. 1964).
's UILA § 3(1). At least one court has held that the commissioner of insurance, in
an ancillary state where residents had claims against a non-domiciliary company, had a
legal duty to exercise his discretion within a reasonable time, either to request appoint-
ment as an ancillary receiver or to transfer his state's special deposit to the domiciliary
receiver. New York ex rel. Bohlinger v. Annat, 68 Ohio Law Abst. 453, 123 N.E.2d
71, 78 (C.P. 1954).
"' UILA § 3(1) ("Whenever under the laws of this state an ancillary receiver is to
be appointed in delinquency proceedings for an insurer not domiciled in .the state, the
court shall appoint the [insurance commissioner] as ancillary receiver.").
3' State ex rel. Low v. Imperial Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 426, 682 P.2d 431, 438 (Ariz.
App. 1984).
40 239 F.2d 289 (1956).
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unnecessary. The state receiver for an Arizona insurance company -
which owned ninety percent of the stock interest in the delinquent com-
pany - also objected to the appointment of a federal receiver.
In reaching its decision to appoint a federal receiver, the court
noted that only six of the twenty-one states holding assets and liabilities
of the delinquent company had adopted the UILA, and that the states
of the company's domicile and principal place of business were unable
(or unwilling) to conduct delinquency proceedings. While emphasizing
the federal court's reluctance to interfere with the domestic policies of
states," the court felt that under the "very special set of circumstances"
of the case, the exercise of the federal court's equity jurisdiction was
warranted."2 Under such extraordinary circumstances, the court found
that appointment of a federal receiver was necessary and proper.4
3
c. Receiver's Control Over Assets
Upon appointment of a domiciliary receiver, the court "shall direct
the receiver forthwith to take possession of the assets of the insurer and
to administer the same under the orders of the court." '44 Most states
have statutes outlining the specific powers and duties of the receiver as
supervisor, conservator, rehabilitator or liquidator of the delinquent
company. In addition to these powers, the UILA vests the domiciliary
receiver (and successors) with title to all property, contracts and rights
of action of the delinquent company, wherever situated, as of the date
of entry of an order giving the receiver possession of the company.45
Upon taking possession of the assets, the domiciliary receiver must pro-
ceed to liquidate, rehabilitate, reorganize or conserve the company.46
Typically, the domiciliary receiver has sole responsibility to operate the
41 The court noted that federal "receiverships for conservation of property 'are to
be watched with jealous eyes lest their function be perverted.'" Id. at 293 (quoting
Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U.S. 377, 381 (1940)).
"I Inland Empire, 239 F.2d at 293. The court suggested that the receivership
could be carried out under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 754, which outlines the powers
of receivers with respect to property situated in different districts.
4' In a similar proceeding, another federal court held that the delinquent company
was not entitled to possession of securities deposited in a state to secure reinsurance
obligations, where it was clear from the state's statutes that the company's only prop-
erty right in the securities was that remaining after the trust had been administered in
accordance with the statutes under which it was created. Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Gold, 140 F. Supp. 252, 257 (E.D.N.C. 1956).
"4 UILA § 2(1).
"5 UILA § 2(2); see Miner v. Punch, 838 F.2d 1407, 1410 (5th Cir. 1988); Mur-
phy v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 195 N.J. Super. 274, 281, 478 A.2d 1243, 1247 (1984).
The domiciliary receiver may sue in a reciprocal state to recover assets of the delin-
quent company. UILA § 10.
46 UILA § 2(3).
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delinquent company, to make policy decisions concerning the conduct of
the delinquency proceedings, and to create a plan for administration of
the company.
If an ancillary receiver is appointed in a reciprocal state, the
UILA provides that the ancillary receiver has the same rights and pow-
ers regarding assets located in the ancillary state as the domiciliary
state would grant to its own ancillary receivers. 47 In addition, the ancil-
lary receiver is deemed to have the sole right to recover assets of the
company located in the ancillary state.48
An ancillary receiver has one duty, however, that is not imposed
upon a domiciliary receiver. An ancillary receiver must, "as soon as
practicable," liquidate from assets in his possession those special deposit
claims and secured claims which are proven and allowed in the ancil-
lary proceedings."9 That being accomplished, any and all remaining as-
sets of the company must be promptly transferred to the domiciliary
receiver.50
As might be expected, battles often erupt between domiciliary and
ancillary receivers over assets, reflecting territorialist interests and' bi-
ases. One of the hardest fought was between the receivers of Vermont
and New Jersey over the assets of Ambassador Insurance Company. In
Murphy v. Ambassador Ins. Co.,51 the delinquent company was domi-
ciled in Vermont, but had done most of its business and had assets of
approximately $100,000,000 in New Jersey. Upon discovering that the
company was insolvent, the Vermont domiciliary receiver instituted de-
linquency proceedings, and ultimately decided to liquidate the
company.
The ancillary receiver in New Jersey then claimed possession of
the company's New Jersey assets, asserting that he had a right to pos-
sess those assets until an actual plan of liquidation had been approved
by the Vermont court. The ancillary receiver believed that because
New Jersey held the lion's share of the company's assets and had a
substantial percentage of the total claims, the ancillary receiver should
maintain possession of local assets.
A New Jersey court disagreed, insisting upon a strict application
of the terms of the UILA (which both states had adopted). In determin-
ing that the New Jersey receiver must turn over local assets to the
47 UILA § 2(2).
48 UILA § 3(2).
"' UILA § 3(2). The ancillary receiver also shall pay all necessary expenses of the
proceedings. Id.
50 UILA § 3(2).
51 195 N.J. Super. 274, 478 A.2d 1243 (1984).
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Vermont receiver, the court relied on the UILA provision which vests
possession and title of the company's assets in the domiciliary receiver,
wherever those assets are located. The court rejected arguments that the
ancillary receiver should maintain possession of the assets because New
Jersey was the principal place of business and the principal situs of the
company's assets, as well as concerns that New Jersey claimants would
not receive equal treatment in Vermont. The court concluded that:
the domiciliary receiver is entitled to possession of Ambassa-
dor's assets wherever situated. This result will centralize the
management of the delinquency proceeding in one state,
eliminate confusion over title and right to possession of the
impaired insurer's assets and best achieve the objectives
sought by the Uniform Act . . .
The Murphy court's strict interpretation of the UILA is typical of
the universalist construction given the statute by other courts. The ra-
tionale behind this tendency towards strict interpretation is perhaps
best stated in a frequently quoted passage from Motlow v. Southern
Holding and Sec. Corp.:
Experience has demonstrated that, in order to secure an eco-
nomical, efficient, and orderly liquidation and distribution of
the assets of an insolvent corporation for the benefit of all
creditors and stockholders, it is essential that the title, cus-
tody, and control of the assets be entrusted to a single man-
agement under the supervision of one court. Hence other
courts, except when called upon by the court of primary ju-
risdiction for assistance, are excluded from participation.
This should be particularly true as to proceedings for the
liquidation of insolvent insurance companies.
53
1.1.4. Claims, Special Deposits and Priorities
Once receivers are appointed in the domiciliary and ancillary sta-
tus, the focus of the UILA shifts to the heart of the receivership process
- the processing and payment of claims. In particular, the UILA pro-
vides for the filing of claims generally, the payment of claims out of
specially deposited assets, and the relative priority of claimants in the
payment process.
52 Id. at 281, 478 A.2d at 1247.
53 95 F.2d 721, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 609.
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a. Filing Claims
Claimants residing in reciprocal states may bring claims against
the delinquent company in either the domiciliary proceeding or in an
ancillary proceeding in their own states. 4 If ancillary proceedings have
not been commenced, a claim against a company in delinquency pro-
ceedings must be presented in the domiciliary proceedings, whatever the
nature of the claim and regardless of where the claimant resides.
55 If
the claims are controverted, and the ancillary forum is chosen for reso-
lution of those claims, proper notice of the disputed claims must be
given to the domiciliary receiver.56 If such notice is given, the final
judgment as to the controverted claim will be conclusive as to amount
and priority in both the ancillary and domiciliary proceedings.57
The UILA also provides that actions for attachment, garnishment,
or execution of a judgment may not be commenced or maintained
against the delinquent company or its assets during the pendency of the
delinquency proceedings.58 Also, any lien obtained against the delin-
quent company within four months prior to the commencement of any
delinquency proceedings is considered void with respect to any rights
arising in such proceeding.5"
b. Special Deposits
Territorialist concerns are given their greatest expression in the
state statutes governing the creation and maintenance of special deposit
funds. Under the UILA, claimants of a given state are given priority
against special deposit funds held for their benefit, according to the
54 UILA § 4(1). See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Northumberland Gen. Ins.
Co., 617 F. Supp. 88, 89 (N.D. Il1. 1985); Clark v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
68 Ill. App. 3d 977, 987, 386 N.E.2d 890, 899 (1979).
55 UILA § 4(1). Many claimants have sought to circumvent this requirement in
an attempt to bring claims in their own states, but unless ancillary proceedings have
been initiated in those states, the courts have uniformly rejected such attempts. See, e.g.,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Northumberland Gen. Ins. Co., 617 F. Supp. 88, 89 (N.D.
Ill. 1985); Zullo Lumber v. King Constr., 146 N.J. Super. 88, 94, 368 A.2d 987, 991
(1976); G.C. Murphy Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 54 N.Y. 2d 69, 77-79, 429 N.E.2d 111,
115, 444 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (1981); Insurance Affiliates Inc. v. O'Connor, 522 F.
Supp. 703, 706 (D. Colo. 1981); Financial Int'l Life Ins. Co. of N.M. v. Beta Trust
Corp., Ltd., 405 So.2d 306, 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Vlasaty v. Avco Rent-A-
Car Systems, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 928, 930, 304 N.Y.S.2d 118, 120 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
56 UILA § 4(2). Notice must be in writing, and must be delivered by registered
mail or personal service at least forty days prior to the date set for the hearing. Id. §
5(2).
5 UILA §§ 4(2), 5(2).
8 UILA § 9.
5 Id.
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state's statutes." If the special deposit claims have not been fully paid,
after all special deposit funds have been exhausted, the special deposit
claimants may share in the general assets of the company." However,
in order to assure equal treatment of all the delinquent company's cred-
itors wherever situated, the special deposit claimants who have already
received a distribution from special deposit funds cannot share in gen-
eral assets until "general creditors, and also claimants against other
special deposits who have received smaller percentages from their re-
spective special deposits, have been paid percentages of their claims
equal to the percentage paid from the special deposit."62
The availability of special deposits to local creditors under the
UILA makes them a natural subject of dispute. For example, in G.C.
Murphy Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co.," an Illinois insurance company, as an
unauthorized foreign insurer, was directed by the State of New York to
post an "undertaking" in New York in response to a lawsuit filed
against the Illinois company there. The Illinois company was required
to post the undertaking before it could file any pleadings in the action.
Approximately six years later, an Illinois court placed the insur-
ance company in liquidation and the liquidator claimed the right to
remove the undertaking from New York as a general asset subject to
the Illinois delinquency proceeding. The beneficiary of the undertaking
claimed that the undertaking was a special deposit against which it was
entitled to proceed in New York.
The Court of Appeals found that the undertaking was not a spe-
60 UILA § 7; see, e.g., State ex rel. Ingram v. Reserve Ins. Co., 303 N.C. 623,
630, 281 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1981); Comm'r of Ins. v. Equity Gen. Ins. Co., 346 Mass.
233, 239-41, 191 N.E.2d 139, 143-44 (1963) (special deposits must be applied in ac-
cordance with statutes under which they were created). Many states have now enacted
statutes which give the state's guaranty fund a priority claim to special deposits on an
expedited basis. State ex rel. Ingram, 303 N.C. at 630-31, 281 S.E.2d at 21. Guaranty
funds are organizations set up in a state whose purpose is to provide expeditious relief
to policyholders in that state in the event of an insurer or reinsurer insolvency. Guar-
anty funds typically are funded through assessments against all insurance companies
doing business in a state in proportion to the amount of business each company writes.
See Hank, Post-Assessment Guaranty Funds: Are They The Ultimate Solution To The
Insolvency Problem?, INS. L.J. 482 (1976). When an insolvency occurs, the guaranty
fund pays resident claimants and is thereby subrogated to the claimants' rights against
the company. Many states have now enacted "quick" or "early access" statutes which
allow the guaranty fund immediate access to any special deposit funds held by the state.
In State ex rel. Ingrain, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the state guaranty
fund's right to special deposits under a quick access statute.
6- UILA § 7.
62 Id.
'3 54 N.Y.2d 69, 429 N.E.2d 111, 444 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1981). Another interesting
dispute arose in Missouri Div. of Ins. v. State ex rel. Fla. Dep't of Ins., 374 So.2d 589
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1979), where a special deposit of one member of a reciprocal
insurance exchange was deemed an asset of another member of the exchange.
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cial deposit within the meaning of the UILA because the undertaking
had been posted for the benefit of a particular claim and not for a
limited class of beneficiaries.64 Moreover, the court held that even if the
undertaking could be deemed a special deposit under the UILA, the
party would have to file its claim in Illinois because New York had not
initiated ancillary proceedings. While the court was sympathetic to the
burden imposed upon a party who was forced to make a claim outside
its own state, the court felt that such a burden was justified in order to
effectuate the purposes of the UILA:
We are also cognizant of the individual hardship suffered by
the present plaintiff, who has been in the throes of litigation
for the past seven years and now must pursue its claim in
the distant forum of Illinois. By enacting the Uniform Insur-
ers Liquidation Act, our Legislature has determined that
such occasional instances of adversity are outweighed by the
paramount interest of the various States in seeing that insur-
ance companies domiciled within their respective boundaries
are liquidated in a uniform, orderly and equitable manner
without interference from external tribunals.6 5
The UILA's treatment of special deposit claims reflects the dual-
istic approach of the Act. On the one hand, special deposit claims are
handled with a healthy regard for the differences between states which
are reflected in their statutory provisions. On the other hand, as the
Murphy decision demonstrates, resolving conflicting claims in a single
proceeding best accomplishes the universalist goals of the Act. The def-
erence to states' territorialist concerns for protecting their own citizens'
special deposit rights, embodied in the universalist procedures of the
UILA, demonstrates that there is a middle ground between the two
extremes.
c. Priority of Preferred Claims
In deciding which claims in a delinquency proceeding will be
deemed "preferred," the UILA adopts a simple rule: the preference or
priority scheme of the domiciliary state controls.66 That is, regardless of
where claims are brought, whether in the domiciliary or in ancillary
proceedings, the law of the domiciliary state is applied to determine the
relative priority of claims. This is another instance of the UILA achiev-
" G.C. Murphy Co., 54 N.Y.2d at 79-80, 429 N.E.2d at 116; accord Fletcher v.
State Treasurer, 16 Mich. App. 87, 167 N.W.2d 594 (1969).
65 G.C. Murphy Co., 54 N.Y.2d at 80-81, 429 N.E.2d at 117 (footnote omitted).
e6 UILA § 6.
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ing its universalist goal by accommodating states' territorialist concerns.
-The priority provisions of the UILA, however, do not replace
other principles generally applicable to the payment of claims. For ex-
ample, the UILA provisions do not eliminate rights of set-off.6" Also,
certain claims might not be elevated in the priority scheme: reinsurance
claims typically will be given no higher priority than claims of general
creditors in distributions under the UILA.e8
1.1.5. Problems Arising Under the UILA
Certain problems have arisen over the years in applying the UILA
to multistate delinquency proceedings. Some of these problems arose
out of disputes over the scope of injunctions or stay orders issued by
receivers, 9 proper timing of claims, 0 and enforcement of judgments
against the delinquent company.
7 1
Other problems have arisen where a non-reciprocal state - a state
867 Barnett Bank of Jacksonville v. Dept. of Ins., 507 So.2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987); Prudential Reins. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 216 Cal. App.
3d 1321, 265 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1990); but see In re Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co.,
Index No. 41294/86, slip. op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 1990) (appeal pending). For a
general discussion of the law of set-offs in insurance insolvencies, see Schwab et al.,
Onset of an Offset Revolution: The Application of Set-Offs in Insurance Insolvencies,
95 Dick. L. Rev. 449 (1991).
11 State ex rel. Long v. Beacon Ins. Co., 87 N.C. App. 72, 359 S.E.2d 508, reh.
denied, 321 N.C. 480, 364 S.E.2d 671 (1987); Pioneer Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Nat'l
Equity Life Ins. Co., 159 Ariz. 148, 765 P.2d 550 (1988).
88 Insurance Affiliates, Inc. v. O'Connor, 522 F. Supp. 703 (D. Colo. 1981) (Illi-
nois injunction prohibiting proceedings against a delinquent company outside Illinois
was not entitled to full faith and credit in Colorado where Illinois had no personal
jurisdiction over the parties in Colorado); Joplin Corp. v. State ex rel. Grimes, 570
P.2d 1161 (Okla. 1977) (any lien attempted to be created in contravention to delin-
quency proceeding injunction is invalid); Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Pettibone
Corp., 505 A.2d 447 (Del. 1985) (New York injunction against the prosecution of
claims against a delinquent company's insureds would not be extended full faith and
credit in Delaware because New York had no personal jurisdiction over the parties);
accord General Acc. Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Hawkins, 115 A.D.2d 357, 495
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1985); Nasef v. U&I Investments, Inc., 91 Or. App. 344, 755 P.2d 136
(1988); Janak v. Allstate Ins. Co., 319 F. Supp. 215 (D.C. Wis. 1970).
70 See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 241 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1970) (date
of delinquency proceedings declaring company insolvent were not determinative as to
the actual date of company's insolvency).
71 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 166 Mich. App. 687, 421
N.W.2d 271 (1988). Another problem which may arise, which is not directly addressed
by the UILA, is multistate insolvencies of a group of affiliated companies. For an inter-
esting discussion of this problem, see Havens and Falon, Insurer Insolvencies: Inter-
state Cooperation, 1986 ABA Sec. Tort & Ins. Practice, Law and Practice of Insur-
ance Company Insolvency 119. For a good discussion of problems under the UILA
involving injunctions and stays, see Gavin, Competing Forums For the Resolution Of
Claims Against An Insolvent Insurer, 1986 ABA Sec. Tort & Ins. Practice, Law and
Practice of Insurance Company Insolvency 151.
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which has not enacted the UILA - is involved in the delinquency
proceedings.
The UILA contains no provisions addressing this circumstance,
and courts have struggled to fashion equitable resolutions for the states
involved. Most often, courts have held that UILA states have no duty to
apply the principles of the UILA with regard to non-reciprocal states.
For example, if a non-reciprocal state is the domiciliary state, courts
have held that receivers in ancillary states are under no duty to return
assets to the domiciliary.72 Other courts, however, have overlooked the
fact that states are non-reciprocal and have enforced UILA-type princi-
ples based on notions of comity.
73
In addition to its lack of provisions governing involvement of non-
reciprocal states in delinquency proceedings, the UILA has several
other "gaps" that have caused difficulties over the years. For example,
the UILA does not address the right of an insurance commissioner in
an ancillary state to initiate delinquency proceedings of some sort in the
ancillary state in the event that delinquency proceedings are never initi-
ated in the domiciliary state. Also, the UILA contains no provisions
governing a domiciliary receiver's remedies in the event that an ancil-
lary receiver refuses to cooperate with the domiciliary receiver in the
collection and distribution of assets.
Some of these problems have been addressed in the Insurers Reha-
bilitation and Liquidation Model Act, an Act that covers many of the
same issues as the UILA and is enjoying increasing popularity in the
United States.
74
71 See Preferred Ins. Co. v. Bentley, 225 Ga. 160, 166 S.E.2d 340 (1969) (assets
of a foreign insurer properly held for local creditor's benefit where domiciliary state
had not enacted UILA); Martin v. General Am. Casualty Co., 226 La. 481, 76 So.2d
537 (1954) (ancillary creditor could satisfy claims out of funds seized in the ancillary
jurisdiction where the domiciliary state was non-reciprocal); Bonura v. United Bankers
Life Ins. Co., 509 So.2d 8 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (Louisiana residents could assert their
claims against a Texas insurance company in receivership in Louisiana because Texas
was not a reciprocal state under the UILA).
71 See, e.g., Twin City Bank v. Mutual Fire & Inland Marine Ins. Co., 646 F.
Supp. 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (New York court granted a stay of judgment to a non-
reciprocal Pennsylvania insurance company in order to avoid creating a preference for
one creditor over another); Kelly v. Overseas Investors, Inc., 24 A.D.2d 157, 264
N.Y.S.2d 586, rev'd on other grounds, 18 N.Y.2d 622 (1965) (the UILA does not
prohibit non-reciprocal states from extending comity to other states as the purpose of
the UILA is to "enlarge rather than to contract the areas for the operation of interstate
comity.").
"' For a good discussion of both the UILA and the Model Act, see Havens, supra
note 71.
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1.2. The Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Model Act
An increasing number of states have enacted the Insurers Rehabil-
itation and Liquidation Model Act (the "Model Act");7 5 in fact, some
states which previously adopted the UILA have revoked it in favor of
the Model Act.7 6 The Model Act contains provisions governing all as-
pects of insurance company regulation in the United States with regard
to conservation, rehabilitation, and liquidation, including provisions
governing multistate proceedings.
77
Derived from the Wisconsin Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquida-
tion Act 7 8 the Model Act was adopted by the NAIC in 1968 as model
legislation for insurer insolvency.7 9 Since then, the NAIC has treated
the Model Act as an evolving statute, responsive to changes in U.S. law
and policy affecting the administration of insurance insolvency. The
NAIC adopted the present version of the Model Act in 197880 in order
to integrate the Act with the developing system of insurance guaranty
funds.81 The NAIC's steadfast goal is to maintain the Model Act as a
statute which fulfills the legal and operational needs of parties involved
in insurer insolvencies, and to maintain coordination with the guaranty
fund model acts.82
The stated goals of the Model Act are to provide improved meth-
ods for the rehabilitation of insurers;8" to make the liquidation process
more efficient and economical;84 to facilitate interstate cooperation in
the rehabilitation and liquidation of insurers; and to protect the inter-
ests of policyholders, claimants and creditors.85 To date, 16 states have
adopted the substance of the Model Act.86
75 1978 Proceedings of the NAIC I, 13, 15, 211, 238-41, 242-75. For the full text
of the Model Act as of June 7, 1990, see 1990 Proceedings of the NAIC II 225.
76 See Appendix A.
" Model Act § 1(D).
78 Wis. STAT. §§ 645.01 et seq. For a good discussion of the development of state
insurance insolvency laws, including the Wisconsin legislation, see Kimball, History
and Development of the Law of State Insurer Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview,
1986 ABA Sec. Tort & Ins. Practice, Law and Practice of Insurance Company Insol-
vency 39-50 [hereinafter Kimball].
1969 Proceedings of the NAIC I, 168, 241, 271.
80 See supra note 75.
81 Kimball, supra note 78, at 43.
82 See, e.g., 1988 Proceedings of the NAIC.II, 351.
83 Model Act § 1(D)(2).
84 Model Act § 1(D)(3).
85 Model Act § 1(D)(5).
88 See Appendix A.
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1.2.1. Structure of the Model Act
The Model Act adopts much of the basic terminology and proce-
dure of the UILA, as well as the same universalist policy objective:
centralization of delinquency proceedings in the domiciliary jurisdic-
tion. It also invokes some of the territorialist principles applied in inter-
preting the UILA, insofar as non-reciprocal states are involved. Differ-
ences between the two statutes derive from the NAIC's efforts to clarify
and improve UILA provisions.
As with the UILA, the Model Act refers to the insolvency pro-
ceeding as a "delinquency proceeding." '87 Delinquency proceedings may
occur in either the domiciliary state,88 an ancillary state, or both,8 9 as
either "summary proceedings" 90 or "formal delinquency proceed-
ings."' States are considered to be reciprocal under the Model Act if
each has enacted the substance and effect of six sections of the Model
Act governing "Interstate Relations."92
1.2.2. Appointment of a Receiver
a. Domiciliary and Ancillary Receivers
The grounds for appointment of a domiciliary receiver under the
Model Act closely parallel those in the UILA.9" The two acts differ,
however, as to the grounds for appointment of ancillary receivers. The
UILA requires the state commissioner to petition for his appointment
as an ancillary receiver if there are sufficient assets in the state to war-
rant such action, or if ten or more residents with claims petition for the
appointment of an ancillary receiver.9 4 Under the Model Act, however,
the decision to petition for appointment as an ancillary receiver is left
to the state commissioner's discretion, who may initiate proceedings if
87 Model Act § 3(D). The Model Act distinguishes between "delinquency pro-
ceedings," generally, and "formal delinquency proceedings," which are limited to reha-
bilitation or liquidation proceedings.
"8 Model Act § 3(F).
"' Model Act § 3(A).
90 Model Act §§ 9, 10. The distinction between summary and formal proceedings
is developed in the next section. See supra notes 93-97.
o' Model Act §§ 11-48.
9 Model Act § 3(0). The six key sections for purposes of reciprocity are Sections
17(A), 51, 52 and 54 through 56. See State of Ohio v. Ramos, 41 Ohio App. 3d 88, 534
N.E.2d 885 (1987) (model legislation is enacted to reduce problems in interstate reha-
bilitation and liquidation proceedings; principles of comity should apply between recip-
rocal states).
OS Model Act §§ 11, 16(B), and §§ 4, 12, 17 (for rehabilitations and liquidations,
respectively).
.4 UILA § 3.
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"the protection of creditors or policyholders in [the ancillary] state so
requires. ' ' 5
Unlike the UILA, the Model Act distinguishes between summary
proceedings96 and formal proceedings.97 Summary proceedings are ini-
tiated by a state commissioner's filing of an ex parte petition seeking
possession and control of an insurer's property, books, accounts, docu-
ments, and other records.98 Summary proceedings are conducted in con-
fidentiality, but may be made public at the request of the insurer or by
order of the court.99 Such proceedings enable the commissioner to exer-
cise control over the insurer while ascertaining what type of further
corrective action may be necessary. Formal delinquency proceedings
consist of rehabilitation and liquidation.'"0 Essentially, summary pro-
ceedings are a prelude to formal proceedings. They enable the receiver
to preserve the status quo until the company's problems are resolved or
formal proceedings begin.
Ancillary proceedings may be either summary or formal, with dif-
ferent purposes and procedures for their initiation. Summary proceed-
ings are territorialist in nature. Whereas ancillary formal proceedings
are designed to enable the ancillary receiver to protect policyholders
and creditors within the jurisdiction and assist the domiciliary liquida-
tor, the goal of ancillary summary proceedings is the preservation of an
insurer's assets and records within the state until formal proceedings
are initiated. Ancillary formal proceedings may be initiated by a state's
commissioner following the appointment of a domiciliary liquidator for
an insurer domiciled in another state.' 0 ' Alternatively, at the request of
the commissioner of the domiciliary state of a foreign insurer having
property located in an ancillary state, the commissioner of the ancillary
state may, in his sole discretion, institute ancillary summary proceed-
ings under the Model Act.'
0 2
b. Receivers of Foreign or Alien Insurer
The Model Act distinguishes between "foreign" (those from any
other U.S. state, district, or territory)' and "alien" (those from an-
9 Model Act § 52(A).
9 Model Act § 53.
97 Model Act § 52.
98 Model Act § 9(B).
9 Model Act § 10.
100 Model Act § 3(D).
101 Model Act §§ 52(A), 9, 10.
102 Model Act § 53.
103 Model Act § 3(R).
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other country)'04 insurers. If grounds exist for the commencement of
delinquency proceedings against a foreign or alien insurer, and no dom-
iciliary receiver has been appointed, the Model Act enables the state
commissioner to petition either the designated state court or any appro-
priate federal district court for an appointment as the receiver.
10 5
Under a state court order, the commissioner, as receiver, may conserve
or liquidate the foreign or alien insurer's assets found in the state. 10 In
a federal receivership, the commissioner may liquidate a foreign or
alien insurer's assets or business within the federal court's jurisdiction
for the protection of policyholders and creditors in the commissioner's
state. 107 Thus, the Model Act fills a gap in the protection provided by
the UILA to policyholders and creditors. Whereas the UILA provides
no mechanism for the liquidation of a foreign or alien insurer's assets
absent the appointment of a domiciliary receiver, the Model Act explic-
itly empowers a commissioner, acting as liquidator, to initiate proceed-
ings and secure assets for the satisfaction of residents' claims, even
when no domiciliary receiver has been appointed. The Model Act
thereby enables a non-domiciliary receiver to protect the territorialist
concerns of his state.
In order to ensure a coordinated effort between liquidators, if a
domiciliary receiver is appointed subsequently in a reciprocal state, the
first liquidator thereafter acts as an ancillary receiver. If a domiciliary
receiver is appointed in a non-reciprocal state, however, then the non-
domiciliary liquidator may, but need not, petition for appointment as
an ancillary receiver.'
1.2.3. Receiver's Control Over Assets
Like the UILA, the appointment of a domiciliary receiver vests the
receiver with title to all of the insurer's assets by operation of law.' 09
Under both the Model Act and the UILA, an executive receivership is
established in which the domiciliary receiver is directed to administer
104 Although the Model Act does not define "alien," it seems clear that the defini-
tion is the same as that of a "foreign country:" "any other jurisdiction not in any state."
Model Act § 3(4). "State" means "any state, district or territory of the United States
and the Panama Canal Zone." Model Act § 3(R).
106 Model Act §§ 49, 50(A), (E).
108 Model Act §§ 49, 50(A).
107 Model Act § 50(E).
108 Model Act § 50(D).
109 Accordingly, the Model Act empowers the domiciliary liquidator to recover
balances due from agents in any reciprocal state (Model Act §§ 3(I), 51(A)), other than
uncollected unearned premiums. See, e.g., Hager v. Anderson-Hutchinson Ins. Agency,
No. 86-841-E (S.D. Iowa, July 19, 1989) LEXIS 13614; Model Act §§ 12(A), 17(A).
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the insurer's assets under the general supervision of the receivership
court.110 However, the Model Act further requires that the receiver
provide periodic accountings to the supervising court.""1 The UILA
does not provide for this extra level of universalist protection.
With respect to assets, the Model Act distinguishes between a
domiciliary liquidator appointed in a reciprocal state and one appointed
in a non-reciprocal state. 12 A domiciliary liquidator appointed in a re-
ciprocal state is vested with title to all assets in all reciprocal states -
except for special deposits and the'security on secured claims - upon
the filing of the petition for liquidation, if the domiciliary state's statute
so provides. When a domiciliary liquidator is appointed in a non-recip-
rocal state, however, the commissioner of the non-reciprocal ancillary
state is vested with title to all of the assets situated in that state.'1 3 No
provision is made in the Model Act for the transfer of such assets to the
domiciliary liquidator.'
If an ancillary receiver is designated after the appointment of a
domiciliary liquidator in a reciprocal state, the ancillary receiver must
utilize any special deposits and security on secured claims located in his
state to satisfy claims of residents. Upon the satisfaction of all special
deposit and secured claims and payment of administrative expenses, all
remaining assets must be transferred to the domiciliary liquidator.
1 1 4
If the commissioner has commenced ancillary summary proceed-
ings at the request of the commissioner of an insurer's domiciliary state,
the commissioner obtains the right to possession and control of the in-
surer's assets and records located within his state. Through his seizure
of the insurer's assets and records, the commissioner is able to assist the
domiciliary commissioner in actions preliminary or supplementary to
formal proceedings in the domiciliary state."1
5
Thus, reciprocity may be viewed as the Model Act's great equal-
izer. By restricting the rights of non-reciprocal state domiciliary receiv-
ers, the Model Act exhorts non-reciprocal states to adopt its universalist
provisions.
1.2.4. Stays and Injunctions
Multistate stays and injunctions further the universalist goals of
the Model Act. Following the entry of an order of liquidation, the
110 Model Act §§ 12(A) (rehabilitation) and 17(A) (liquidation).
111 Model Act §§ 12(B), 17(E).
112 Model Act §§ 51(A), (B).
113 Model Act § 52(C).
114 Model Act § 51(B).
115 See Comment, Wis. STAT. § 645.85 (1980).
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Model Act enjoins the prosecution of all claims at law, equity, or in
arbitration. 116 The Model Act requires that full faith and credit be
given to anti-suit injunctions entered in liquidation proceedings com-
menced in another state, if that other state would do likewise. The in-
junction enables the liquidator to evaluate all claims against the insol-
vent insurer uniformly.
Unlike the unlimited duration of the stay that arises upon the fil-
ing of a liquidation order, the Model Act provides only a 90 day stay
(unless extended for a specified period) in rehabilitation proceedings.'1
During this limited time period, the rehabilitator must retain counsel,
prepare for further proceedings, and take such action against pending
litigation as is necessary in the interests of justice and for the protection
of policyholders, creditors, and the public. The rationale behind this
provision is that if the rehabilitator needs to avoid actions instituted
against the insurer, then the insurer should be liquidated rather than
rehabilitated.11 8
The limited duration of the rehabilitation stay, however, may frus-
trate a receiver's efforts to control actions against the insurer. For ex-
ample, in Smalls v. Weed," 9 a Tennessee rehabilitator (Smalls) sought
a stay of a bad faith action against the insurer which was pending in
South Carolina, in order to compel the plaintiff to pursue his claim in
the Tennessee rehabilitation proceedings. Noting that under South
Carolina's statute an action against a company in rehabilitation is
stayed for only 90 days following entry of the rehabilitation order - as
opposed to the unlimited duration of liquidation stays - the court held
that Smalls could maintain his suit in South Carolina because the in-
surer was in rehabilitation, not liquidation.
1.2.5. Claims
The Model Act and the UILA treat the filing of claims simi-
larly. 20 Creditors may assert claims against the insolvent insurer's gen-
eral assets or, if appropriate, they may pursue a special deposit claim.2
or a secured claim.' 22 However, while the UILA is silent as to the
116 Model Act § 23(A). The liquidator has discretion, however, to allow actions to
proceed if the circumstances so warrant.
117 Model Act § 14(A).
118 Comment, Wis. STAT. § 645.34(a) (1980 & Supp. 1990).
19 360 S.E.2d 531 (S.C. App. 1987) (apparently decided under UILA-type provi-
sions quite similar to the Model Act).
o Model Act §§ 54, 55.
'=' Model Act § 3(0).1' Model Act § 3.
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rights of residents in non-reciprocal states to file claims, the Model Act
specifically allows such claimants to file their claims with the domicili-
ary liquidator. 2
1.2.6. Priority of Distribution
Under the Model Act, general assets are distributed in accordance
with the domiciliary state's priority of distribution scheme. 24 An ancil-
lary court's determination of priority is not binding upon the domicili-
ary liquidator.'
25
a. Federal Priority
Although the Model Act's priority of distribution schedule is con-
trolling as to most claims, recent authority suggests that federal govern-
ment revenue claims may not be subject to the priority scheme of any
state. In Idaho ex rel. Soward v. United States, 28 the Ninth Circuit
held that the Model Act's priority schedule, 2 7 as enacted by the State
of Idaho, did not preempt the Federal Insolvency Statute,1 28 and that
the federal government was entitled to receive full payment of its claim
prior to satisfaction of obligations owing to all other creditors. The
court's holding was based upon a determination that insurance insol-
vency proceedings are not "the business of insurance within the mean-
ing of the McCarran-Ferguson Act."' 29 Thus, the Model Act's primary
goal - protecting the interests of insureds - was undermined.' 30
b. Subordinated Priority
The Model Act encourages interstate cooperation by penalizing
claimants residing in states where the ancillary receiver fails to transfer
any assets (other than special deposits less administrative expenses) to
122 Model Act § 54(A).
124 Model Act § 57(A) (priority of distribution involving reciprocal states).
12 Model Act § 54(B).
126 858 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 2062 (1989); accord
Gordon v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 846 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 390; but see Fabe v. United States Dep't of Treasury, No. 90-3364 (6th Cir.
1991). For a general discussion of the federal priority issue, see Howard, Uncle Sam
Versus the Insurance Commissioners: A Multi-Level Approach to Defining the "Busi-
ness of Insurance" Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 25 WILLAMET-rE L. REV. 1
(1989).
127 Under Model Act § 41(F), the federal government's claim would share at the
fifth priority level.
128 31 U.S.O. § 3713.
129 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
'30 Model Act § 1(D).
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the domiciliary receiver. The penalty exacted is the subordination of
claims filed in the ancillary proceeding, other than special deposit or
secured claims, to the next to last class of claims under the priority of
distribution schedule. 13 Thus, the sins of the receiver are visited on the
policyholders with whose protection he is charged. The UILA contains
no similar penalty provisions.
In summary, the Model Act - which has been enacted by an
increasing number of states"3 2 that once abided by the UILA - repre-
sents an attempt to clarify and improve the UILA. Although similar to
the UILA, the Model Act provides a more comprehensive scheme for
addressing the insolvency of domestic as well as foreign insurers. Its
territorialist treatment of non-reciprocal states, and its penalty provi-
sions against uncooperative ancillary states, provide incentives for adop-
tion by nonsignatory states.
1.3. Federal Bankruptcy Protection
The principal disadvantage of both the UILA and the Model Act
lies in the fact that neither act has been adopted by all American states
and territories. The federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
"Code")13 3 does not suffer from the same defect: it is national legisla-
tion applicable in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and the U.S.
territories. It provides a comprehensive scheme for the resolution of in-
dividual and corporate insolvency. In general, the Code offers bank-
rupts three types of relief: reorganization under Chapter 11; adjustment
of debts by composition, extension or discharge under Chapters 9, 12
and 13; and liquidation under Chapter 7.
Whether an insolvent may avail itself of any such relief depends
upon whether it is a "debtor" under the Code. Under the Code, domes-
tic and foreign insurance companies cannot be "debtors," '' and thus
are denied the full measure of the Code's protection and relief. The
reason for this exclusion derives from the states' pervasive regulation of
the business of insurance and Congress' delegation to the states of the
exclusive authority to regulate such activity. 3 When Congress enacted
the statutory predecessor to the Code (The Bankruptcy Act of 1898), it
determined that insurance companies are "bodies for which alternative
131 Model Act § 58. See also Model Act § 41 (classes for priority of distribution).
132 In fact, the NAIC has implemented an accreditation procedure which likely
will result in more states adopting the Model Act. 1990 Proceedings of the NAIC II,
23.
13 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1988).
134 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), (d) (1988).
13- 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
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provision is made for their liquidation under various regulatory
laws,"'3 6 and therefore excluded them from domestic bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Nevertheless, Section 304111 of the Code empowers "foreign
representatives" 138 of an insolvent foreign insurer involved in "foreign
[delinquency] proceedings"' 3 9 to invoke the Code's protective measures
and remedies in aid of the foreign proceeding. The central themes of
Section 304 are assistance for foreign representatives and judicial flexi-
bility to fashion that relief.'40 Section 304 thus represents an effort to
unilaterally adopt the universalist theory.'
4'
1.3.1. Section 304
In formulating Section 304, Congress was aware of the growth of
multinational business and of the complexities that arise when a large
multinational entity becomes enmeshed in a foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Congress also was aware that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did
not contain express provisions giving a foreign receiver the flexibility
required to resolve the problems that arise when foreign proceedings
136 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 318-19 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5817,
6275.
The rationale for excluding insurance companies from protection under the Bank-
ruptcy Code was explained in In re Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity, 286 F.
180, 184 (N.D. Ga. 1923):
The affairs of an embarrassed or insolvent insurance company often re-
quire much technical skill and judgment and time for their adjustment and
a carrying forward of the business, to prevent lapses and to permit rein-
surance to simplify them. And considering the variety of insurance obliga-
tions assumed and the various statutes thereof, a chief practical difficulty
is the ascertainment of who are really to be considered creditors and in
what amounts, often requiring much time and elaborate accounting for its
solution. Under such circumstances even the election of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy could be difficult, and a creditors' meeting could hardly prosecute
any business, owing to conflicting interests of the various classes of claims.
137 Section 304 is set forth in Appendix B in its entirety.
138 Under the Code, a "foreign representative" is a "duly selected trustee, admin-
istrator, or other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding." 11 U.S.C. §
101(23).
139 "Foreign proceeding" is defined to mean a:
proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and whether or not under
bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, resi-
dence, principal place of business, or principal assets were located at the
commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an es-
tate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a
reorganization.
11 U.S.C. § 101(22).
140 NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 9A.09, at 15 [hereinafter
NORTON].
141 Id., § 9A.08, at 14.
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are instituted and creditors seize assets located in the United States.' 42
With these problems in mind, Congress endeavored in the Code to
establish a statutory scheme that could provide a foreign representative
with a flexible framework within which to confront the multitude of
situations that can arise in a multinational insolvency. In particular,
Section 304 of the Code gives a foreign representative the option to
commence an ancillary proceeding.143 The section thus gives foreign
representatives a formidable tool to fashion a uniform administration
for an international insurance insolvency by enabling them to adminis-
ter a debtor's U.S. assets, prevent dismantlement 44 by local creditors,
and obtain other appropriate relief through ancillary proceedings con-
ducted in the United States.'
45
Consistent with its purpose, the procedure for obtaining Section
304 relief differs from that for invoking a bankruptcy court's general
jurisdiction. A petition filed under Section 304 does not commence a
full and conventional bankruptcy case,' 46 but merely supplements a
proceeding pending before a foreign court or administrative tribunal.'
47
The bankruptcy court, therefore, does not sit as an appellate court over
142 Matter of Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 Bankr. 597, 604-06
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Nevertheless, U.S. courts often had deferred to foreign case administration in the
name of comity. Thus, in In re Stoddard, 242 N.Y. 148, 151 N.E. 159 (1926), the
New York Court of Appeals held that the New York State Superintendent of Insurance
should disburse to the receiver of a Norwegian insurer, the balance of a special deposit
the insurer had placed with the state.
14 Foreign representatives of debtors which are not insurance companies have the
additional option to file a bankruptcy case under § 303(b)(4), or seek dismissal or
suspension under § 305 of a pending bankruptcy case. Axona, 88 Bankr. at 606. The
first option is not available to the receiver of a foreign insurance company because, as
previously noted, an insurance company cannot be a debtor under the Code. The sec-
ond option also is not a viable alternative, unless, for example, the foreign insurer has a
U.S. branch or subsidiary which is the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding.
1,4 In re Lines, 81 Bankr. 267, 271 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (the "principal pur-
pose of § 304 is to allow 'foreign bankrupts to prevent piecemeal distribution of assets
in this country by filing ancillary proceedings in domestic bankruptcy courts.' ") (quot-
ing Victrix Steamship Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo, A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 713-14 (2d Cir.
1987)).
145 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978).
146 The procedures for commencement, prosecution and defense of an ancillary
case are set forth in Bankruptcy Code § 101(19) and (20) (defining "foreign proceed-
ing" and "foreign representative"), and Bankruptcy Rules 1002 (providing that a peti-
tion commencing a case shall be filed with the clerk), 1010 (governing service of the
petition and summons), 1011 (governing responsive pleadings), and 1018 (governing
contested petitions). Venue of the case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1410 (1988). For a
general discussion of this procedure, see COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTIcE GUIDE ch.
19 (1990) [hereinafter COLLIER].
147 Axona, 88 Bankr. at 606.
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the foreign proceedings. 4"
Certain disadvantages flow from the limited nature of the proceed-
ing. For example, the filing of a Section 304 petition does not automati-
cally stay the initiation or continuation of any other proceeding in the
U.S. against the debtor 4" (thus the foreign representative should con-
sider moving for a temporary restraining order when filing the Section
304 petition); a trustee cannot be appointed for the Section 304 pro-
ceeding as in a Chapter 7 or 11 case; no separate U.S. estate is created;
and the foreign representative cannot take advantage of the Code's
powers to avoid fraudulent transactions and recover preferential prein-
solvency transfers.
150
Despite these limitations, the remedies available in a Section 304
proceeding are quite broad. If the Section 304 petition is not timely
controverted, the court, in its discretion, may grant three types of relief:
injunction, turnover,151 or "other appropriate" relief. 2 However, the
court's exercise of its discretion is to be guided by what will best assure
an economical and expeditious administration of the estate, consistent
with six criteria: just treatment of all claimholders; protection of United
States claimholders against discrimination in the foreign proceeding;
prevention of preferences and fraudulent transfers; distribution of estate
proceeds "substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this
title;" comity; and, if appropriate, the opportunity for a "fresh start"
for the debtor.'5 3 The courts have held that the "other appropriate re-
lief" provision of Section 304(b)(3) means that the court "is free to
broadly mold appropriate relief in near blank check fashion.' 54 The
148 In re Gee, 53 Bankr. 891, 904 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
149 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). Under Section 362, the filing of a bankruptcy petition
operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of the commencement, continuance or en-
forcement of any judicial, administrative or other action or proceeding against the
debtor or its property.
150 NORTON, supra note 140 § 9A.09, at 16-17. Another difference (and a major
advantage) of Section 304 lies in the fact that an appearance by the foreign representa-
tive in a Section 304 proceeding does not submit the foreign representative to the juris-
diction of any court in the U.S. for any other purpose. 11 U.S.C. § 306 (1988).
151 One of the more frequent forms of a bankruptcy court's exercise of its jurisdic-
tion in a Chapter 11 or 7 proceeding is the issuance of an order requiring turnover of
the debtor's property or its proceeds to the supervision and control of the bankruptcy
court. This is commonly called a "turnover" order. COLLIER, supra note 146 §
19.09[2], at 19-18.
152 11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1988).
'as 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988). The six factors are said to be codifications of his-
torical factors that American courts have weighed when deciding whether to accord
comity to a foreign court's decision. NORTON, supra note 140, § 9A.12, at 22.
154 In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). Thus, § 304 has ena-
bled foreign representatives to attach assets (Id.); challenge alleged fraudulent or pref-
erential transfers (In re Metzeler, 78 Bankr. 674 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)); pursue
discovery (In re Gee, 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)); seek relief from a stay
[Vol. 12:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol12/iss3/1
INSURANCE INSOLVENCIES
breadth of this provision should not, therefore, be underestimated.
1.3.2. Section 304 and Foreign Insurers
The foreign representatives of at least two insolvent reinsurers
have invoked the power of Section 304. The first reported decision, In
re Gee,15 5 concerned a defunct Cayman Islands reinsurance company,
Universal Casualty & Surety Co. Ltd. ("Universal"). Universal's man-
agement was located in New York, its records were scattered through-
out Mexico, New York and London, and its creditors resided on three
continents. A creditor filed a petition in the Cayman Islands requesting
that the company be wound up, and Allan Gee was appointed receiver.
Gee filed a Section 304 petition to commence an ancillary proceed-
ing in a New York bankruptcy court. He sought various forms of relief,
including discovery, preliminary injunctions prohibiting certain individ-
uals from disposing of Universal's assets, books, and records, and orders
directing that all of Universal's property and records be turned over to
Gee. Universal's New York directors responded by filing a Chapter 11
petition to have Universal placed into reorganization bankruptcy.
The parties presented their arguments to the New York court.
Universal argued that the company could not be subject to Section 304
because it had no assets in New York. The court quickly rejected this
argument, because the statute contains no such requirement. Universal
next argued that Section 304 did not apply to it because it could not be
a bankruptcy debtor; the court responded that such a limitation would
eviscerate the purpose of Section 304. The court easily disposed of Uni-
versal's last argument - that the filing of its Chapter 11 petition su-
perseded the Section 304 case - because it, too, would render Section
304 meaningless.
The court then applied the six criteria of Section 304 to determine
the nature of the relief to be granted. It observed that the most signifi-
cant criterion is comity - "the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of an-
other nation, having due regard both to international duty and conve-
nience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.""' 6 As the court explained, comity will
or file a proof of claim in a pending U.S. bankruptcy case (In re A. Tarricone, Inc., 80
Bankr. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)); In re Enercons Va., Inc., 812 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir.
1987)); and to file involuntary bankruptcy petitions (In re Centre de Tricots de Gaspe,
Lte., 10 Bankr. 148 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981)).
155 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
156 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895). But see In re Papeleras Reunidas
S.A., 92 Bankr. 584, 594 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("it is best to equally consider all of
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be granted to a foreign court's decision or judgment if it is shown that
the foreign court is one of competent jurisdiction, and that the laws,
public policy, and rights of the forum jurisdiction's residents will not be
violated. 57 For comity to be extended, the foreign court must abide by
fundamental standards of procedural fairness.
158
The court concluded its analysis by comparing the provisions of
the Cayman Islands Companies Law to the Code. Although some dif-
ferences were found, they were held to be insubstantial: "It is not nec-
essary that the [foreign jurisdiction's bankruptcy laws] be a carbon copy
of the Bankruptcy Code; rather, it must be of a nature that it is not
repugnant to American laws and policies .-. .,"" The court therefore
concluded that Gee should be awarded the relief he sought.
The only other reported case involving a foreign insurer's invoca-
tion of Section 304 is In re Lines."1 0 Lines involved The River Plate
Reinsurance Co. ("River Plate"), a Bermudan reinsurer having its
the variables of § 304(e) in determining the appropriate relief in an ancillary
proceeding").
157 In re Gee, 53 Bankr. at 901. "Foreign-based rights should be enforced unless
the judicial enforcement of such a [right] would be the approval of a transaction which
is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense."
Axona, 88 Bankr. at 609 (citing Culmer, 25 Bankr. at 629 (citing Cornfeld v. Investors
Overseas Serv., Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting Intercontinental
Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 13, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (1964)))).
Exceptions to the doctrine of comity are narrowly construed, particularly when the
foreign proceeding is in a sister common law jurisdiction with procedures akin to those
in the U.S. Courts have held that the bankruptcy laws of the following jurisdictions
satisfy the "substantially similar" requirement of § 304(c)(4) or the requirements of
comity: Bahamas, In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Bermuda, In
re Lines, 81 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Canada, Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen,
544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976) (but see In re Toga Mfg., 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1983)); Cayman Islands, In re Gee, 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Dubai, Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Ecuador, In re Banco de Descuento, 78 Bankr. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987);
England, In re Lines, 81 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); France, Kenner Prod-
ucts Co., Div. of CPG Products Corp. v. Societe Fonciere et Financiere Agache-Willot,
532 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Hong Kong, In re Axona Int'l Credit of Commerce
Ltd., 88 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Italy, In re Enercons Va., Inc., 812 F.2d
1469 (4th Cir. 1987); Luxembourg, lIT Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1980); Mexico, In re Banco Nacional de Obras Y Servicio Publicos, 91 Bankr.
661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Netherlands Antilles, In re Colo. Corp., 531 F.2d 463
(10th Cir. 1976); and Sweden, Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Serv. A.B., 773 F.2d
452 (2d Cir. 1985). Courts have indicated, however, that the bankruptcy laws of Aus-
tralia, Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of the M/V Venture Star, 102 Bankr. 373
(D. N.J. 1988), and Spain, In re Papeleras Reunidas, 92 Bankr. 584 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1988), do not gatisfy the requirements of § 304.
'58 In re Gee, 53 Bankr. at 902. See also Interpool, Ltd., 102 Bankr. at 378
("Procedural protections provided in the Bankruptcy Code are considered of paramount
importance.").
159 In re Gee, 53 Bankr. at 904 (citing In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. at 621).
160 81 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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principal place of business in Hamilton, Bermuda. River Plate trans-
acted business in the United States. In order to sell reinsurance in the
State of New York, River Plate had established a trust fund of US $1.5
million with a New York bank. The fund was to serve as security for
River Plate's American insureds and reinsureds for the payment of
claims and return of unearned premium.
Reinsurance Company of America ("RCA") was reinsured by
River Plate. RCA obtained and registered in New York a $600,000
judgment. RCA attempted to levy on the trust fund to satisfy its judg-
ment. Shortly thereafter, a petition to wind-up River Plate was filed in
Bermuda, and two liquidators were appointed. The liquidators filed a
Section 304 petition in New York seeking to enjoin the commencement
of any actions or the enforcement of any judgments against River Plate.
RCA opposed the liquidators' motion for injunctive relief on two
grounds. First, RCA argued (like Universal) that the Section 304 peti-
tion must be dismissed because River Plate could not be a debtor under
the Code. Relying on Gee, the court easily disposed of that argument.
RCA then argued that the $600,000 it claimed was not the property of
the River Plate estate under Bermuda law. The court addressed the
terms of the trust agreement and applicable provisions of The Compa-
nies Act of Bermuda, and concluded that the liquidators had demon-
strated a probability of successfully establishing an ownership interest
in the fund sufficient to warrant injunctive relief to protect the fund
against diminution. Reasoning that the estate of a foreign debtor is de-
fined by the law of the jurisdiction in which the foreign proceeding is
pending, the court determined that resolution of the property issue
would be left to the Bermuda court.
16 1
The court then turned its attention to the six factors of Section
304(c). While noting that "affording comity to a foreign proceeding
does not require a finding that the foreign court will grant comity to
United States law,"1 2 the court nonetheless was satisfied that comity
required that the Bermudan court be given the opportunity to rule on
RCA's ownership claim. Thus, the liquidators prevailed on all points
and obtained the injunctive relief they sought.
161 In re Lines, 81 Bankr. at 273 (implicates the second (protection of U.S.
claimholders) and fourth (distribution of estate proceeds substantially in accordance
with the Code's priority system) factors under § 304(c)).
162 Id. (citing Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Serv., AB, 773 F.2d 452,
460 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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1.3.3. Unanswered Questions
Despite the clear benefits of Section 304 for foreign representatives
of insolvent insurers, a number of issues arise which have yet to be
answered. The most obvious question relates to claims priority."6 3 In
the United States, most states have enacted priority schemes for the
distribution of the assets of insolvent insurers that place policyholders'
claims above the claims of general unsecured creditors;"" in fact, most
states regard claims of reinsureds as general creditor claims. 65 As a
result, reinsureds' claims are rarely paid.
The Bankruptcy Code, however, makes no distinction between the
claims of policyholders and reinsureds, and under Section 304(c)(4), the
Code's priority system applies, not the distribution scheme of any state
or country. Thus, although a United States policyholder could expect a
greater distribution in a state proceeding administering the assets of a
foreign insurance company, Section 304 has effectively eliminated her
priority. The fact that Universal and River Plate were both foreign
reinsurers (none of whose claimants were insureds) may explain the
reason why this issue was neither raised nor addressed in either the
Gee or Lines decisions. It should not be assumed, however, that this
conflict of laws question has been settled.
Another troubling question relates to the number of ancillary pro-
ceedings that a foreign representative must initiate in order to protect
assets located in different states in the United States. The federal statu-
tory venue provision requires that the petition must be filed only in the
district where the asset sought to be protected or the action sought to be
enjoined is located.' 6 This suggests that the foreign representative must
file a separate petition in each such district. If that is the case, then the
advantage of the Section 304 proceeding is limited in a case involving
multistate assets, as the representative could be required to litigate in
multiple jurisdictions under the risk of inconsistent results. The threat
to unified administration of an international insolvency posed by such
an interpretation of the statute undoubtedly will be addressed in future
litigation.
1"I Closely related is the question of whether assets turned over to the foreign
representative should be used first to satisfy the claims of Unites States creditors and
then to satisfy the claims of foreign debtors. See Norton, supra note 140, § 9A.11, at
21. 2 4 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 817(1)(c),(d) (West Supp. 1990);
NAIC Model Act § 42. The same is true in Canada as well. See R.C.S. ch. W-11, §
161(2) (1985).
"65 See, e.g., In re Liquidations of Reserve Ins. Co., 122 Ill. 2d 555, 524 N.E.2d
538, 542 (1988).
166 28 U.S.C. § 1410 (1988).
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These and other questions await legislative or judicial resolution.
The merits of Section 304, however, are clear. Between the UILA, the
Model Act, and Section 304, the road to a universalist approach to
multinational insurance insolvencies is being paved, albeit slowly. It
now remains to consider how those efforts meet with the approaches of
two of the jurisdictions in which American insurers frequently transact
insurance business, England and Canada.
2. ENGLISH LAW
2.1. Introduction: Cross-Border Insolvencies
Cross-border insolvencies have been a source of difficult legal
problems in England for many years. Around 1825, Jabez Henry, an
English barrister, published a pamphlet in which he drew attention to
the inevitable conflict between a country's insolvency laws favoring lo-
cal creditors and the fundamental principle of insolvency proceedings
that all creditors, local and foreign, should be afforded equal treatment.
Promoting a universalist approach, Henry stated:
Each State of Europe though perhaps not aware of it while
it frames its bankrupt code with a view solely to its own
subjects, is in fact indirectly legislating for all the other states
of Europe, by affecting foreign property and interests in a
material degree. One great advantage to be expected from
the adoption of something like a uniform system on this head
is that it would place the subjects of each on a footing of
equality as to those rights which they are equally acknowl-
edged to possess, whether as favoured nations by particular
conventions or otherwise; and it would besides enable every
man, when trading with a foreigner, to know his risk and
remedy. 
1 7
As early as 1849, England's Bankruptcy Act contained universalist
provisions aimed at dealing with the problems of cross-border insol-
vency. Section 220 of that Act provided that the bankruptcy courts in
167 Graham, Cross-Border Insolvency, 42 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 217, 224
(1989) (quoting J. Henry, Outline of Plan of an International Bankrupt Code for the
Different Commercial States of Europe).
Henry Wheaton, the American jurist, when asked by Jabez Henry whether he
could conceive a general bankruptcy code for Europe, America and the Colonies, re-
sponded that such "an international bankrupt code would doubtless be beneficial; but I
should think that the difficulties in establishing it by general consent would be found
almost insuperable." Id. at 225. (This statement appears valid in light of the failure of
the draft European Convention on Bankruptcy and Related Matters.)
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London and the provinces should be:
auxiliary, for all purposes of proof of debt, and for the ex-
amination of persons and witnesses upon oath, or for other
like purposes, to the courts acting in matters of bankruptcy
or insolvency in Scotland and in Ireland, and also to any
court acting in such matter in any colony, island, plantation,
or place under the Dominion of Her Majesty or, to any Brit-
ish judge elsewhere so acting.'68
English courts in the 19th century also addressed problems aris-
ing from concurrent foreign liquidation proceedings. In the 1889 case
of North Australian Territory Co. v. Goldsbrough, Mort, and Co.,"69
liquidation proceedings were commenced in Australia against an En-
glish company after similar proceedings had been commenced in Eng-
land. The Australian proceedings were deemed to be ancillary to the
English proceedings:
The winding-up in [England] must go according to the law
of this country, and according to the law of the corporation,
which is a corporation in this country. Therefore any order
made by the Australian courts for winding-up in Australia
would merely be ancillary, just as in the converse case an
order made in this country for winding-up an Australian
company could only be ancillary to any winding-up taking
place in Australia.'
In England's Bankruptcy Act 1914, a provision was made for
U.K. courts and "every British court elsewhere" to assist one another
in bankruptcy matters."' This provision was the precursor to the cur-
rent English statutory law governing cross-border insolvency, Section
426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 ("Insolvency Act"). Section 426 is the
sole U.K. statutory provision obligating U.K. and other courts to assist
one another in matters of insolvency law..7 2 However, it is supple-
mented by English laws of jurisdiction, special deposits, appointments
of liquidators, Mareva injunctions, and the options available to foreign
liquidators in sequestrating English assets and meeting the claims of
English and foreign creditors.
168 Id. at 225 (citing Bankruptcy Act 1849 § 220).
169 61 L.T.R. 716, 717 (Jan. 25, 1890) (dec'd 1889).
170 Id.
"' Bankruptcy Act 1914 § 122.
171 See infra note 235.
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2.2. England's Law of Insolvency
English corporate insolvency is governed by the Insolvency Act,
the Insolvency Rules 1986 ("Insolvency Rules"), " ' and the Companies
Act 1985 ("Companies Act"), as amended by the Companies Act 1989
("1989 Act"). The Insolvency Act, Insolvency Rules and Companies
Act set forth several insolvency procedures for companies: administra-
tion;174  administrative receivership; 175  voluntary arrangements; 7 6
schemes of arrangement; 77 and liquidation. 78 This part of the paper
focuses on liquidation proceedings.
2.3. England's Law of Insolvency as it Relates to Insurance and
Reinsurance Companies
In the United Kingdom:
there is specific legislation relating to insurance insolvency
(Insurance Companies Act 1982, Insurance Companies
Winding-Up Rules 1985 and Policyholders Protection Act
1975), but its general application is only to direct insurance
(principally life insurance), and there is no specific reinsur-
ance application.' 79
The Insurance Companies Act 1982, as amended ("Insurance
Companies Act"), which regulates domestic and foreign insurance com-
113 S.I. 1986, No. 1925, as amended by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 1987,
S.I. 1987, No. 1919 and S.I. 1989, No. 397. Under the Insolvency Act § 411(5), the
Secretary of State has promulgated the Insolvency Regulations 1986 ("Regulations"),
S.I. 1986, No. 1994.
"" Insolvency Act § 8-27; Insolvency Rules Part 2.
178 Insolvency Act § 28-72; Insolvency Rules Part 3.
17' Insolvency Act § 1-7; Insolvency Rules Part 1.
177 Companies Act § 425-7. For a general discussion of administration, voluntary
arrangements and schemes of arrangement, see Anderson, Amreco: A Step Towards
International Rehabilitations, 7 J. INS. REG. 388, 404 et seq. (1989) [hereinafter
Anderson].
178 Insolvency Act § 73-246; Insolvency Rules Part 4.
179 Singer, The British Approach to Reinsurance Insolvency, 1988 A.B.A Sec.
Tort & Ins. Practice, Law and Practice of International Reinsurance Collections and
Insolvency 623, 624 [hereinafter The British Approach]. See also Transnational As-
pects, supra note 3, at 1125 ("Thus, although there is specific legislation relating to the
insolvency of insurance companies, there is none specifically designed for or applicable
to reinsurance companies. It is therefore necessary for the practitioner to seek to apply
to reinsurance insolvencies legislation primarily designed for direct insurance.").
It has been observed in J. BUTLER & R. MERKIN, REINSURANCE LAW, Part
A.3.3 (1990) [hereinafter BUTLER & MERKIN], that strong arguments can be made
both for and against whether reinsurance falls within the scope of the Insurance Com-
panies Act. For purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that the provisions of
that Act regulate the conduct of reinsurance business in the U.K.
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panies that carry on insurance business in the United Kingdom, pro-
vides that insurance companies may be liquidated under the Insolvency
Act.180 The Insurance Companies Act also sets forth certain liquidation
procedures which apply to insurance companies, in addition to the pro-
cedures contained in the Insolvency Act."s ' The Insurance Companies
(Winding-Up) Rules 1985 ("Insurance Companies Rules")'82 give ef-
fect to the provisions of the Insurance Companies Act relating to the
liquidation of insurance companies." 3 The Insurance Companies Rules
supplement the Insolvency Rules, 8 4 and in the event of a conflict be-
tween the Insurance Companies Rules and the Insolvency Rules, the
Insurance Companies Rules prevail.'
8 5
Under the Insurance Companies Act and Insurance Companies
Rules, the assets and liabilities of an insolvent insurance or reinsurance
company's long-term and general business 8 must be treated as assets
and liabilities of separate companies for purposes of applying the assets
in discharge of its liabilities under the Insolvency Act.18 7 The Insurance
Companies Rules further provide that the Secretary of State may, if an
insurer's long-term business is continued by a liquidator under the In-
surance Companies Act, 88 require all or part of the assets representing
the funds maintained by the insurer in respect of its long-term business
to be held by a person approved by the Secretary of State as trustee.'8 9
Those assets may not be released without the Secretary of State's
180 See generally Insurance Companies Act §§ 53-59. For a discussion of whether
the Insurance Companies Act applies to reinsurance companies, see Anderson, supra
note 177, at 411.
181 See supra note 178.
182 As amended by the Insurance Companies (Winding-up) (Amendment) Rules
1986, S.I. 1986, No. 2002. Promulgated under the Insurance Companies Act, § 59.
183 Transnational Aspects, supra note 3, at 1129 ("The basic principle underly-
ing both the Insurance Companies Act and the [Insurance Companies Rules], which
provide a detailed framework of rules to be followed by the liquidator of an insurance
company, is that there must be a strict separation between the assets and liabilities
relating to . . . primarily life assurance . . . and the assets and liabilities relating to
other business of the Company."). See also Insurance Companies Regulations 1981,
S.I. 1981, No. 1654 [hereinafter Insurance Regulations], as amended by the Insurance
Companies (Amendment) Regulations 1982, S.I. 1982, No. 675, and the Insurance
Companies (Amendment) Regulations 1985, S.I. 1985, No. 1419.
184 The Insurance Companies Rules also supplement the Regulations.
185 Insurance Companies Rules 3(2).
188 The definitions of "long-term business" and "general business" are set forth in
the Insurance Companies Act § 1(1). Long-term business includes life insurance. Gen-
eral business includes accident, sickness, ships, property damage, motor vehicle liability,
aircraft, general liability and miscellaneous financial loss. Id. scheds. 1, 2.
18 See Insurance Companies Act § 55(3), (4); Insurance Companies Rules 5.
188 Insurance Companies Act § 56(2).
189 Insurance Companies Rules 15(1).
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consent. 90
The Policyholders Protection Act 1975 ("1975 Act") is territorial-
ist legislation which provides for "indemnifying... or otherwise assist-
ing or protecting policyholders and others who have been or may be
prejudiced in consequence of the inability of insurance companies car-
rying on business in the United Kingdom to meet their liabilities under
policies issued or securities given by them." It also provides for impos-
ing levies on the insurance industry for such a purpose.1 91
2.4. Special Deposits
Under the Insurance Companies Act, "no person shall carry on
any insurance business in the United Kingdom unless authorised to do
so . ... "192 Section 9 of the Insurance Companies Act provides that
such authorization must be denied if the applicant's main office is not
located in a member State of the European Community, unless the ap-
plicant has made a deposit with the Accountant General of the Su-
preme Court.' 93 No deposit is required, however, if the scope of the
authorization is restricted to reinsurance. 9"
The amount of the deposit is governed by statutory formula. 96
The deposit may be made, partly or wholly, in cash or permitted secur-
ities.' 96 If the applicant is subsequently liquidated in the United King-
dom, the amount of the deposit must be repaid to the applicant. 9
10 Insurance Companies Rules 15(2).
'9" 1975 Act § 1. See also 1975 Act § 8(4) and 10(1), which limit the application
of the 1975 Act to U.K. policies of insurance, "not being [policies] of reinsurance."
1975 Act § 8(4). It should be noted, however, that if reinsurance falls within the scope
of the Insurance Companies Act, reinsurance companies who are authorized to carry on
reinsurance business in the U.K. may be obligated under § 21 of, and sched. 3 to, the
1975 Act to contribute to a fund established under the 1975 Act for the protection of
insurance policyholders.
192 Insurance Companies Act § 2(1).
Insurance Regulations 14, 15. The twelve member states of the European
Community are the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, and the
Republic of Ireland.
194 Insurance Companies Act § 9(3).
195 Insurance Regulations 15. The amount of the deposit must be maintained by
the applicant at a level equal to at least the "minimum." The "minimum" is one-half
of the minimum guaranty fund appropriate to the margin of solvency which the appli-
cant is required to maintain under the Insurance Companies Act. Insurance Regula-
tions 14. For provisions relating to minimum guaranty funds and margins of insol-
vency, see Insurance Regulations 4, 9.
1I Insurance Regulations 14, 17.
197 Insurance Regulations 20(2).
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2.5. England's Law Governing Cross-Border Insolvencies
Before domiciliary or ancillary proceedings to liquidate a company
may be commenced in an English court, the person seeking to initiate
the proceedings should determine whether the court has jurisdiction to
liquidate the debtor company. The making of that determination re-
quires knowledge of a number of rules.
2.5.1. Jurisdiction of English Courts to Liquidate Companies
a. Circumstances in Which English Courts Have Jurisdiction
Generally, English courts have jurisdiction to liquidate any com-
pany registered in England,"98 or any unregistered company.'99 How-
ever, an English court's jurisdiction to liquidate an unregistered com-
198 Insolvency Act § 117(1).
199 Insolvency Act §§ 221(1), (5), 225. In re Matheson Bros. Ltd. [1884] 27 Ch.
D. 225; In re Commercial Bank of S. Australia [1886] 33 Ch. D. 174; In re Federal
Bank of Australia [1893] W.N. 77; In re The Syria Ottoman Ry. Co. [1904] 20 T.L.R.
217. 1986 Act § 220 provides that a company which is not registered in any part of the
U.K. under companies legislation is an unregistered company. An "overseas company,"
as defined in § 744 of the Companies Act, is not xn unregistered company. Overseas
companies include companies incorporated elsewhere than in Great Britain which, after
July 1, 1985, establish a place of business in Great Britain, and companies so incorpo-
rated which have, before that date, established a place of business and continue to have
an established place of business in Great Britain at that date. Id. Oversea companies
are required to be registered in the U.K. under §§ 691-99 of the Companies Act, as
amended by § 145, of and sched. 19 to, the 1989 Act. An insurer incorporated outside
the U.K. which carries on insurance business within Great Britain must register as an
overseas company under §§ 691-99 of the 1985 Act by virtue of § 87 of the Insurance
Companies Act, as amended by sched. 2 to the Companies Consolidation (Consequent-
ial Provisions) Act 1985. Section 225 of the Insolvency Act provides that "[w]here a
company incorporated outside Great Britain which has been carrying on business in
Great Britain ceases to carry on business in Great Britain, it may be [liquidated] as an
unregistered company. . . notwithstanding that it has been dissolved or otherwise
ceased to exist as a company under or by virtue of the laws of the country under which
it was incorporated." It has been submitted that the scope of §§ 220 and 221 of the
Insolvency Act is uncertain. Howcroft & Totty, Impact of US Chapter 11 Proceedings
on English Assets of an American Company [1988] 1 J. INT'L BANKING L. 18. They
state:
The provisions relating to winding-up of unregistered companies are
stated in section 220 to apply to any "company," an undefined term which
arguably would not apply to a corporation established under the laws of
the US. There is further uncertainty in that section 221(2) may apply to
determine the court's jurisdiction absolutely or may apply to determine
simply whether, as between the courts of Britain, the courts of Scotland or
the courts of England should take jurisdiction. I submit that the better
view is that "company" does apply to a US corporation and that section
221(2) is to determine simply which of British courts should take
jurisdiction.
Id. n.22.
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pany is contingent utpon the debtor company (i) having assets, and
creditors who would benefit from a liquidation order, within the juris-
diction,2 °0 and (ii) being insolvent or, if solvent, not having its seat in a
State which is a party to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed at
Brussels in 1968 ("Convention"). The Convention defines the jurisdic-
tion of United Kingdom courts, and the courts of other signatory coun-
tries, in civil and commercial matters.20 1
English courts also have jurisdiction to liquidate an unregistered
solvent company whose central management or control is exercised in
England.20 2 However, if such company is incorporated in another Con-
vention country and that country regards the company as having its
seat there, then the courts of that country would also have jurisdiction
and English courts must decline jursidiction in favor of the court first
seised. 0 3
English courts have jurisdiction to liquidate any company regis-
2I In re Compania Merabello San Nicholas S.A. [1973] 1 Ch. 75; In re Eloc
Electro-Optieck and Communicatie B.V. [1982] 1 Ch. 43; In re A Company (No.
00359 of 1987) [1988] 1 Oh. 210 (the debtor company must have a sufficient connec-
tion with the jurisdiction and there must be a reasonable possibility that benefit will
accrue to creditors of the debtor company from the liquidation - it is not necessary
that the unregistered company have assets within the jurisdiction).
201 For purposes of this paper, the Convention includes the Protocol on the inter-
pretation of the Convention by the European Court, signed at Luxembourg on June 3,
1971. The Convention is, by virtue of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982,
as amended by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (Amendment) Order
1989, S.I. 1989, No. 1346 ("CJJ"), an operative part of English law. CJJ § 2(1)
("The [Convention] shall have the force of law in the United Kingdom, and judicial
notice shall be taken [thereof]."). The following countries have acceded to the Conven-
tion: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, and Greece. Section 43(2) of the CJJ
provides that a company has its seat in the U.K. if and only if it was incorporated or
formed under the law of a part of the U.K. or its central management and control is
exercised in the U.K. Moreover, under § 43(3) of the CJJ, a company has its seat in a
particular part of the U.K. if and only if it has its seat in the U.K. and (i) being
incorporated or formed under the law of a state other than the U.K., its central man-
agement and control is exercised in that part, or (ii) it was incorporated or formed
under the law of that part. Note that under § 43(5) of the CJJ, a company incorpo-
rated or formed under an enactment forming part of the law of more than one part of
the U.K. or an instrument having effect in the domestic law of more than one part of
the U.K. shall, if it has a registered office, be taken to have its seat in the part of the
U.K. in which that office is situated, and not in any other part of the U.K.
202 A.V. DicEY & J.H.C. MORRIS, 2 Conflict of Laws 1137-38 (11th ed. 1987)
[hereinafter DICEY & MORRIS].
2I Insurance Companies Act sched. 1, art. 23 ("Where actions come within the
exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, any court other than the court first seised shall
decline jurisdiction in favour of that court."). For a discussion of when a court is first
seised, see BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 179, at D.4.1-31.
Thus, the Convention subscribes to the third theory of conflicts of laws noted by
Fry, L.J. See supra note 2.
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tered in England, regardless of whether it is solvent or insolvent. The
Convention does not apply to the liquidation of insolvent companies. 0 4
In addition, Article 16(2) confers exclusive jurisdiction, in relation to
the liquidation of companies, on the courts of the country in which the
company has its seat.20 5 A company registered in England has its seat
therein.
20 6
b. Liquidation of Unregistered Companies
In determining whether English courts have jurisdiction to liqui-
date unregistered companies, several principles apply:
(1) There is no need to establish that the company ever had
a place of business [in England].
(2) There is no need to establish that the company ever car-
ried on business [in England], unless perhaps the petition is
based on the company carrying on or having carried on
business.
(3) A proper connection with the jurisdiction must be estab-
lished by sufficient evidence to show (a) that the company
has some asset or assets within the jurisdiction, and (b) that
there are one or more persons concerned in the proper distri-
bution of the assets over whom jurisdiction is exercisable.
(4) It suffices if the assets of the company within the juris-
diction are of any nature; they need not be 'commercial' as-
sets, or assets which indicate that the company formerly car-
ried on business [in England].
(5) The assets need not be assets which will be distributable
to creditors by the liquidator in the winding-up: it suffices if
by the making of the winding-up order they will be of bene-
fit to a creditor or creditors in some other way.
(6) If it is shown that there is no reasonable possibility of
benefit accruing to creditors from making the winding-up or-
24 The Convention does not apply to "bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the
winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, com-
positions and analogous proceedings."
20. CJJ § 1(2). Convention art. 16(2). Article 16(2) provides that:
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisidiction, regardless of domi-
cile ... in proceedings which have as their object the validity of the consti-
tution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or
associations of natural or legal persons, or the decisions of their organs,
the courts of the Contracting State in which the company, legal person or
association has its seat.
20I DIcEY & MORRIS, supra note 202, at 1139.
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der, the jurisdiction is excluded.20 7
Assuming the court has jurisdiction, an unregistered company may
be liquidated under the Insolvency Act only:
(a) if the company is dissolved, or has ceased to carry on
business, or is carrying on business only for the purpose of
winding up its affairs;
(b) if the company is unable to pay its debts; [or]
(c) if the court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that
the company should be wound up. °8
2.5.2. English Liquidation Procedures
The Insolvency Act and Insolvency Rules prescribe in detail the
procedures to be followed when a company is liquidated in the United
Kingdom and the manner in which the liquidation must be conducted.
Some of the procedures differ depending on whether the liqudiation is
of a compulsory or voluntary nature.
a. Governing Law
The liquidation of a company under the Insolvency Act is gov-
erned by English law.2 9 Therefore, all issues relating to the liquida-
tion, including the proving of creditors' claims, the determination of
priorities among creditors, and matters of procedure are regulated by
207 Re Compania Merabello San Nicholas S.A. [1973] Gh. 75. See also In re
Kailis Groote Eylandt Fisheries Pty. Ltd. [1977] 17 S.A.S.R. 35 (local creditors with-
out local assets held insufficient to confer jurisdiction); In re Allobroqia Steamship
Corp. [1978] 3 All E.R. 423 (for this purpose, the term "assets" is broadly construed
and may include a right of action, provided that it has a reasonable possibility of
success).
208 Insolvency Act § 221(5). Insolvency Act § 222 provides:
An unregistered corporation is deemed ... unable to pay its debts if there
is a creditor, by assignment or otherwise, to whom the company is in-
debted in a sum exceeding 750 [pounds Sterling] then due and
(a) the creditor has served on the company, by leaving at its princi-
pal place of business, or by delivering to the secretary or some di-
rector, manager or principal officer of the company, or by otherwise
serving in such manner as the court may approve or direct, a writ-
ten demand in the prescribed form requiring the company to pay
the sum due, and
(b) the company has for 3 weeks after the service of the demand
neglected to pay the sum or to secure or compound for it to the
creditor's satisfaction.
See also Insolvency Act §§ 223, 224, for a discussion of when an unregistered
company is unable to pay its debts.
209 DIcEY & MORRIS, supra note 202, at 1147. Compare Insolvency Act §
426(5), infra note 241.
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the Insolvency Act and the Insolvency Rules.210 English law similarly
governs liquidation proceedings in English courts which are being ad-
ministered concurrently with foreign liquidation proceedings, even if
the English proceedings are declared "ancillary" to those foreign pro-
ceedings. The policy behind this application of English law was articu-
lated in In re Suidair International Airways:
If [English law governs] no confusion will result. If it is de-
parted from, I cannot see how any other result would follow
than the utmost possible confusion. Who could lay down as a
clear and exhaustive proposition where the court was to
draw the line in any particular case between administering
the English law and the law of the main liquidation? 1
b. Appointment of Liquidators
The procedure for appointment of liquidators depends upon
whether the liquidation is compulsory or voluntary.
212
c. Compulsory Liquidations
The circumstances under which a compulsory liquidation of an
insurer may be initiated are specified in the Insolvency Act and the
Insurance Companies Act,2 13 and include the inability of the company
to pay its debts, 14 or a court determination that liquidation is just and
equitable. A petition for an order of compulsory liquidation may be
presented to the court either by the company, its directors, one or more
creditors or contributories,2 15 ten or more policyholders owning policies
210 All such issues are also governed by the Regulations. See DIcEY & MORRIS,
supra note 202, at 173 ("All matters of procedure are governed by the domestic law of
the country to which the court wherein any legal proceedings are taken belongs (lex
fori).").
211 [1951] 1 Ch. 165, 173-74.
212 For detailed rules of procedure, see Insolvency Rules Parts 4, 7-13; Insolvency
Act §§ 388-98.
212 Insolvency Act § 122(1); Insurance Companies Act §§ 53, 54. Note, however,
that under § 124(5) of the Insolvency Act, if a company is being voluntarily liquidated,
a court may not make a compulsory liquidation order unless it is satisfied that the
voluntary liquidation cannot be continued with due regard to the interests of the credi-
tors or contributories.
2," As such term is defined in the Insolvency Act § 123 and the Insurance Compa-
nies Act § 54(3). Note that under the Insurance Companies Act § 58, if an insurance
company is "unable to pay its debts," the court may reduce the amount of the com-
pany's contracts on such terms and subject to such conditions as the court thinks just, in
place of making a liquidation order.
215 Insolvency Act § 124(1). A "contributory" is defined in § 79 of the Insolvency
Act as every person liable to contribute to the assets of a company in the event of its
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of an aggregate value of not less than ten thousand pounds Sterling, or
the Secretary of State.216 Upon presentation of the petition, the court
may appoint a provisional liquidator.117 Typically, the provisional liq-
uidator is the official receiver,"' although the court is empowered to
appoint any other suitably qualified person. 21 ' The official receiver, as
provisional liquidator, may seek a court order appointing a special
manager with such powers as the court directs. 220 Upon entry of a com-
pulsory liquidation order, the official receiver becomes the liquidator of
the company until he is replaced at a meeting of the creditors or con-
tributories summoned for that purpose.
2 21
d. Voluntary Liquidations
There are two types of voluntary liquidations, those of members
and those of creditors.222 A company may be voluntarily liquidated if it
being liquidated.
216 Insurance Companies Act §§ 53, 54. A petition may not be presented by such
ten or more policyholders except with the leave of the court, which will not be granted
until a prima fade case has been established to the court's satisfaction and until secur-
ity for costs for such amount as the court thinks reasonable has been given. Note also
that under the Insurance Companies Act § 54(4), if it appears to the Secretary of State
that it is expedient in the public interest that the company should be liquidated, he
may, unless the company is already being liquidated by the court, present a petition for
it to be so liquidated, if the court thinks it is just and equitable.
21 Insolvency Act § 135(1). See also Insolvency Rules 4.25-4.31.
218 For purposes of the Insolvency Act, the official receiver in a liquidation is any
person who, by virtue of §§ 399 and 401 is authorized to act in that capacity. Under §
399(2) of the Insolvency Act, the Secretary of State may, subject to Treasury approval
as to numbers, appoint persons to the office of official receiver. The official receivers
are paid out of Parliamentary funds, hold office on such terms and conditions as the
Secretary of State directs and may be removed from office if directed by the Secretary of
State. See also Insolvency Rules 10, 4.104; Insolvency Act § 137.
219 Insolvency Act § 135(2).
220 Insolvency Act § 177; Insolvency Rules 4.206-4.210. See also Insurance Com-
panies Act § 56(3) ("If the liquidator is satisfied that the interests of the creditors in
respect of liabilities of the company attributable to its long- term business require the
appointment of a special manager of the company's long term business, he may apply
to the court, and the court may on such application appoint a special manager of that
business to act during such time as the court may direct, with such powers, including
any of the powers of a receiver or manager, as may be entrusted to him by the court.").
221 Insolvency Act § 136(1), (2), (4). Under § 137(1) of the Insolvency Act, the
official receiver may apply to the Secretary of State for the appointment of a person as
liquidator in his place. Also, under § 401 of the Insolvency Act the Secretary of State is
authorized to appoint deputy official receivers. See also Insolvency Act, §§ 136(3),
139(3), (4); Insolvency Rules 4.100, 4.102.
222 Insolvency Act § 90 (If the directors of the corporation have made a statutory
declaration of solvency in accordance with § 89 of the Insolvency Act, then within 5
weeks after a resolution of the corporation to voluntarily liquidate itself, the liquidation
is deemed a members' voluntary liquidation. All other voluntary liquidations are credi-
tors' voluntary liquidations). Under § 221(4) of the Insolvency Act, no unregistered
company may be voluntarily liquidated. See also Insolvency Act § 96.
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passes a special resolution that it be voluntarily liquidated or an ex-
traordinary resolution to the effect that it cannot by reason of its liabili-
ties continue its business and that it is advisable to liquidate.223 In a
members' voluntary liquidation, the directors of the company convene a
meeting of the company at which one or more liquidators is appointed
for the purpose of winding-up the company's affairs and distributing its
assets.224 On the appointment of the liquidator, all the powers of the
directors cease absent specific approval.22 No insurance company
which carries on long-term insurance business within the U.K. may be
voluntarily liquidated.226
In a creditors' voluntary liquidation, the company convenes a
meeting of its creditors, 22 7 who then may nominate a liquidator.
22 8 If
the creditors fail to choose a liquidator, the company may do so. 229
e. Duties of Liquidators
Under English law, a liquidator must wind-up the worldwide af-
fairs of the debtor company and apply its assets in satisfaction of for-
eign and English creditors' claims. 230 A liquidator must take into cus-
tody or under control all the property and things in action to which the
company is or appears to be entitled.23' However, a court may order
that the liquidator must not take into custody or under control assets
situated outside of England, or that the liquidator must not settle a list
2I Insolvency Act § 84(1). A company may also be voluntarily liquidated when
the period, if any, fixed for the duration of the company by the Articles of Association
(i.e., the by-laws) expires, or upon the occurrence of an event which the Articles of
Association provide shall result in the company being dissolved, and the company in a
general meeting has passed a resolution for voluntary liquidation.
"' Insolvency Act § 91(1). If no liquidator is appointed or nominated by the com-
pany, see Insolvency Act § 114.
225 Insolvency Act § 91(2).
226 Insurance Companies Act §§ 55(2), 15.
227 Insolvency Act § 98(1)(a). The creditors' meeting must be summoned for a day
not later than the fourteenth day after the day on which the company in a general
meeting resolves to be voluntarily liquidated.
228 Insolvency Act § 100(1).
129 Insolvency Act § 100(2). See also Insolvency Act §§ 100(3), 104; Insolvency
Rules 4.101, 4.101A, 4.103. Under § 108(1) of the Insolvency Act, the court may ap-
point a liquidator in a members' or creditors' voluntary liquidation if "from any cause
whatever there is no liquidator acting." Under § 108(2), the court may, on a showing
of cause, "remove a liquidator and appoint another." Under § 109 of the Insolvency
Act, with respect to a liquidator appointed in a members' or creditors' voluntary liqui-
dation, the liquidator must within 14 days after his appointment publish and register a
notice of his appointment. The liquidator is liable for fines if he fails to do so.
0 In re Azoff-Don Commercial Bank [1954] 1 Ch. 315 (non-U.K. creditors may
prove their claims in U.K. liquidation proceedings in the same manner as U.K.
creditors).
231 Insolvency Act § 144(1).
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of creditors to include foreign creditors without the court's direction. 232
The powers of English liquidators are enhanced first by the universal-
ist provisions of Section 426,233 and second by the territorialist nature
of Mareva injunctions.
2.5.3. Section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986
Under English common law, the existence and dissolution of a
company validly created under the law of a foreign country is governed
by that law.234 Section 426 of the Insolvency Act supplements the com-
mon law by obligating courts of different jurisdictions to recognize liq-
uidation orders of foreign courts and to give assistance to liquidators
appointed by those courts.23 5
Section 426 provides that an order made by any U.K. court exer-
cising insolvency law jurisdiction is enforceable in any other part of the
United Kingdom as if it were made by a court exercising the corre-
sponding jurisdiction.2 6 Furthermore, U.K. courts having insolvency
law jurisdiction must assist courts having the corresponding jurisdiction
in the United Kingdom or any designated country or territory. 237 The
insolvency law of a designated country or territory means "so much of
the law of that country or territory as corresponds to" insolvency law in
the United Kingdom.2"8 Insolvency law in the United Kingdom, as de-
2' In re Hibernian Merchants Ltd. [1958] 1 Ch. 76.
233 Insolvency Act § 426 is set forth in its entirety in Appendix C.
2S4 See DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 202, at 1128 (citing Bonanza Creek Gold
Mining Co. v. R. [1916] 1 A.C. 566 (P.C.); National Bank of Greece and Athens S.A.
v. Metliss [1958] A.C. 509; Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim, The Times (London),
November 22, 1989 at 43, col. 6.) See also Lazard Bros. v. Midland Bank [1933] 1
A.C. 289 ("The will of the sovereign authority which created it can also destroy it.").
235 Section 426 received its impetus in the Cork Report, which states that modern
insolvency law should "ensure due recognition and respect abroad for English insol-
vency proceedings." The Cork Report was prepared by a Government-appointed In-
surance Law Review committee chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork. The committee ex-
amined England's law relating to insolvency, bankruptcy, liquidation and receivership
and published its report in 1982. See Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Re-
view Committee, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, Cmnd. 8558.
28 But see 1989 Act §§ 183(2), (3). See also § 426(2), which provides that §
426(1) shall not require a court in any part of the U.K. "to enforce, in relation to
property situated in that part, any order made by a court in any other part of the"
U.K.
22l Insolvency Act § 426(4).
Designated countries and territories include Anguilla, Australia, the Bahamas,
Bermuda, Botswana, Canada, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibralter,
Hong Kong, Montserrat, New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland, St. Helena, the Turks
and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, and the Virgin Islands. See Cooperation of Insolvency
Courts (Designation of Relevant Countries and Territories) Order 1986, S.I. 1986, No.
2123.
2I Insolvency Act § 426(10)(d).
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fined,28 9 includes provisions regulating the marshalling and distribution
of assets, the proving of creditors claims and the winding-up of the
affairs of insolvent companies.
The assisting court has discretion in deciding the manner in which
the assistance is to be given,240 and is empowered to apply either the
insolvency law of its jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of the requesting
court. However, the assisting court, in exercising its discretion, must
have particular regard "to the rules of private international law. "241
Courts have yet to interpret this clause.
242
The universalist appeal of Section 426 is akin to that of the Amer-
ican Section 304. Both statutes empower receivers to obtain judicial lev-
erage to move international insolvency proceedings in a unified direc-
tion. They stand in sharp contrast with other territorialist measures.
29 The "insolvency law" of England and Wales is defined in Section 426(10) (a)
as "provision made by or under [the Insolvency Act] or sections 6 to 10, 12, 15, 19(c)
and 20 (with Schedule 1) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986." See
also 1989 Act § 183(1).
The application of Section 426 depends, at least in part, on how courts interpret
the term "corresponds to." Woloniecki, Co-Operation Between National Courts In In-
ternational Insolvencies: Recent United Kingdom Legislation, 35 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 644, 656-57 (1986) [hereinafter Woloniecki] ("In the case of a requesting court
which applies its insolvency law to, say, an English company which does business in
and has assets present within the jurisdiction of the [court requesting assistance under
section 426], the requesting court's legislation corresponds in a narrow sense to section
221 of the Insolvency Act 1986. In such a case the English court would be bound
[under section 426(4)] to assist a liquidator appointed by the requesting court. How-
ever, it is submitted that the foreign liquidator would not be automatically entitled to
the company's assets situated in England. It is probable that, acting under [section
426(4)], the English court would require that winding-up proceedings be brought in
England."). Thus, if the U.K. courts recognize the requesting court's jurisdiction to
liquidate a foreign company, then the U.K. courts would appear to be bound to provide
assistance to a liquidator appointed by that court.
240 See id. at 653 (the court may give conditional assistance or demand certain
undertakings from the foreign liquidator.). See also In re Osborn 1931-1932 B. & C.R.
189, 194 ("I think this court is bound to give all the assistance that it can.").
241 Insolvency 'Act § 426(5). Assistance may not be given if the proceedings of the
court requesting it are "hopelessly bad under their own proper law, or [offend] against
some overriding principle of English public policy." In re A Debtor (Order in Aid No.
1 of 1979) ex parte Viscount of the Royal Court of Jersey [1981] 1 Ch. 384, 402. For
example, when the foreign judgment is obtained by fraud (Abouloff v. Oppenheimer &
Co. [1882] 10 Q.B.D. 295) or when the foreign proceedings contravened principles of
natural justice (Jacobson v. Frachon [19271 138 L.T.R. 386). Also, assistance may not
be given if it aids the enforcement of a foreign revenue law. But see Ayres v. Evans
[1981] 56 F.L.R. 235.
242 However, orders in deed, which are not reported, appear to have been granted
in chambers under § 426 of the 1986 Act.
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2.5.4. Mareva Injunctions
The effectiveness of any liquidation order made by an English
court depends, at least in part, on the court's ability to ensure that the
debtor company does not attempt to frustrate the purpose of that order
by liquidating assets within and outside of the jurisdiction. English law
protects creditors relying on liquidation orders by means of "Mareva"
injunctions and ancillary disclosure orders.
243
Mareva injunctions have been used to prohibit the removal of as-
sets from the jurisdiction of England or Wales, in an effort to discour-
age defendants from attempting to frustrate plaintiffs in their execution
of judgments.2 44 Recent case law2 45 has expanded the scope of Mareva
243 In 1975, in Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulk-Carriers
S.A. [1975] 2 Lloyds Rep. 509, the Court of Appeal granted an injunction restraining
the defendant from dealing with its assets so as to make itself judgment- proof. Since
that decision, English courts have granted injunctions (commonly referred to as
"Mareva" injunctions) restraining defendants from removing or otherwise dealing with
assets both within and outside of the jurisdiction.
244 Ashtiani v. Kashi [19861 2 All E.R. 970. See also the Supreme Court Act 1981
§§ 37(1) and (3), under which the courts have statutory authority to grant a Mareva
injunction restraining a party from removing from the jurisdiction of the court, or oth-
erwise dealing with, assets located within that jurisdiction in cases where that party is,
as well as in cases where he is not, domiciled, resident or present within that
jurisdiction.
"' Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne [1988] W.L.R. 232, 242 ("in appropriate
cases, though these may well be rare, there is nothing to preclude our courts from
granting Mareva type injunctions against defendants which extend to their assets
outside the jurisdiction"); Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier [1989] 1 All E.R. 456; Bayer
A.G. v. Winter, The Times, March 24, 1986; Derby & Co. v. Weldon [1990] Ch. 65.
In Derby, Lord Donaldson stated that courts
'have unlimited power to grant an injunction in any case where it would
be right or just to do so: and what is right or just must be decided, not by
the caprice of the judge, but according to sufficient legal reasons or on
settled legal principles' [quoting Beddow v. Beddow [1878] 9 Ch.D. 89,
93] ... In my judgment, the key requirement for any Mareva injunction,
whether or not it extends to foreign assets, is that it shall accord with the
rationale upon which Mareva relief has been based in the past. That ra-
tionale, legitimate purpose and fundamental principle I have already
stated, namely, that no court should permit a defendant to take action
designed to frustrate subsequent orders of the court.
The court stated a preference that any Mareva injunction with extraterritorial effects
should be subject to the following proviso:
Provided that, in so far as this order purports to have any extraterritorial
effect, no person shall be affected thereby or concerned with the terms
thereof until it shall be declared enforceable or be enforced by a foreign
court and then it shall only affect them to the extent of such declaration or
enforcement unless they are: (a) a person to whom this order is addressed
or an officer of or an agent appointed by a power of attorney of such a
person or (b) persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of this court and
(i) have been given written notice of this order at their residence or place
of business within the jurisdiction, and (ii) are able to prevent acts or
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injunctions to provide that defendants must restrain from dealing with
assets, wherever they might be, if their actions are designed to frustrate
subsequent orders of the court. Nevertheless, "unqualified Mareva in-
junctions covering assets abroad can never be justified."246
a. Pre-Conditions of Mareva Injunctions
There are four fundamental conditions a plaintiff must satisfy to
obtain a Mareva injunction:
(1) The [English court must have] jurisdiction over the de-
fendant in relation to the claim;24
(2) The plaintiff [must have] a good arguable case against
the defendant;
(3) The defendant [must have] assets... which can be frozen
by the Mareva injunction; [and]
(4) [There must be] a real risk that unless a Mareva injunc-
tion is granted any judgment obtained could not be
executed.24
A good arguable case is "one which is more than barely capable of
serious argument, but not necessarily one which the judge considers
would have a better than 50 per cent chance of success."249 In deter-
mining whether there is a real risk that a defendant will frustrate the
plaintiff's execution of judgment, courts consider evidence of the de-
fendant liquidating assets or removing them from the jurisdiction, the
evasive nature of the defendant in dealing with the plaintiffs claim,
and other unexecuted judgments against the defendant. 250 Moreover, a
Mareva injunction will only be granted if the plaintiff represents to the
court that it will compensate the defendant for any losses suffered by
reason of the injunction if the plaintiff's claim fails, and pay the costs of
complying with the injunction incurred by any third party. 251 Failure
to comply with the terms of a Mareva injunction may result in the
imposition of fines or imprisonment for contempt of court.252
omissions outside the jurisdiction of this court which assist in the breach of
the terms of this order.
248 Id. at 77, 79. Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v. Bassatne [1988] 2 F.T.L.R. 116.
241 Mitchell, Mareva Injunctions [1988] 1 J. INT'L BANKING L. 23, 24 [hereinaf-
ter Mitchell] (citing Siskina v. Distos S.A. [1979] A.C. 210, 254 (the power to grant a
Mareva injunction "presupposes the existence of an action, actual or potential, claiming
substantive relief which the High Court has jurisdiction to grant.")).
248 Mitchell, supra note 247, at 23.
249 Id. at 24 (citing The Ninemia [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep. 600).
250 Id. at 25.
251 Id. Plaintiffs' undertakings vary from case to case.
252 Id. Note that Mareva injunctions may be served on and enforced against third
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b. Disclosure Orders
In addition to granting Mareva injunctions over extraterritorial as-
sets, English courts also have jurisdiction to order the disclosure of such
assets.2 53 A disclosure order will be issued if disclosure will assist the
plaintiff in tracing assets which were wrongfully removed by the de-
fendant from the jurisdiction, or enable the court to determine the va-
lidity of the defendant's claim that he needs U.K. assets to meet
expenses.254
c. Transatlantic Application
A frequently cited case explaining the application of Mareva in-
junctions in the context of transatlantic business is Felixstowe Dock and
Ry. Co. v. United States Lines, Inc.,25 which evinces the territorialist
nature of this relief. In Felixstowe, an English court refused to set aside
Mareva injunctions directed against a U.S. company which was the
subject of American reorganization bankruptcy proceedings. United
States Lines ("USL") was a Delaware company which transacted busi-
ness in England. USL petitioned a U.S. bankruptcy court under Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which triggered a stay of the com-
mencement and continuation of all local and foreign actions against
USL. The debtor and a creditor's committee had implemented a plan of
reorganization which depended upon a consolidation of the company's
operations. This in turn was dependent upon return to the United
States of USL's English assets.
Certain U.K. creditors of USL applied for and obtained Mareva
injunctions in U.K. courts restraining the removal of USL's English
assets from the U.K. USL argued in the English court that by re-
straining the removal of the company's assets, the English court was
preventing the assets from being administered by the United States
bankruptcy court and the creditors committee. The English court, how-
ever, considered the existence of the reorganization plan as but one of
the matters to be weighed in determining whether the injunctions
should be upheld. The court found that retaining the assets in the
United Kingdom would give the plaintiffs - each of whom had claims
against the U.S. company - security for a worthwhile percentage of
parties in possession the defendant's assets.
M Republic of Haiti v. Duvalier [1989] 1 All E.R. 456.
I" Mitchell, Mareva Injunctions and Domestic Assets [1988] 3 J. INT'L BANK-
ING L. 210, 211. See also Derby & Co. v. Weldon, [1990] Ch. 65, 94 ("It may be open
to argument in some future case that in certain circumstances a discovery order can be
made with a wider ambit than the Mareva injunction to which it is ancillary.").
255 [1989] 1 Q.B. 360.
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their debts, whereas if transferred to the United States, the assets would
be "a mere drop in the ocean of the total assets" and of marginal bene-
fit to the company and its U.S. creditors. The court thus determined
that the U.S. company would suffer no material prejudice if the injunc-
tions were upheld. Although the assets would remain in the United
Kingdom, the court found there would be no prospect of the assets be-
ing distributed without the intervention of ancillary liquidation pro-
ceedings. Moreover, the court considered that the plaintiffs would suf-
fer substantial prejudice if the injunctions were discharged because the
assets would be used to keep the United States company alive as a
growing concern in a manner from which the plaintiffs could not possi-
bly derive any benefit due to the United States company's proposed
withdrawal from Europe.
Before the decision in Mareva,256 no method or procedure existed
to protect a plaintiff who feared that a defendant was taking steps to
render itself judgment-proof. Over the last fifteen years, the law of
Mareva injunctions and ancillary disclosure orders has developed to
such an extent that English courts now have jurisdiction to restrain
judgment debtors from dealing with their assets, wherever they might
be. So long as the granting of Mareva injunctions and the making of
ancillary disclosure orders is consistent with principles of comity and
international law - by ensuring that the defendant (e.g., a foreign
debtor company or a foreign liquidator of a debtor company) has a
sufficient connection with and is subject to the jurisdiction of the En-
glish courts - English creditors of foreign debtor companies have a
powerful territorialist tool to assist them in deriving maximum benefit
from any ancillary liquidation proceedings they bring or rely on in
England. In particular, a Mareva injunction may aid a foreign liquida-
tor by freezing a debtor company's U.K. assets pending the outcome of
foreign liquidation proceedings.
2.5.5. The Liquidation of Foreign Companies with Assets andlor
Creditors in England
The liquidator of a foreign company which has assets and credi-
tors in the United Kingdom may rely upon universalist and territorial-
ist U.K. laws and procedures to facilitate an orderly and efficient ad-
ministration of the debtor's estate. Although Section 426 is the obvious
tool available to a liquidator of a foreign company located in a desig-
nated territory, there are numerous other options available to liquida-
25 Supra note 243.
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tors of companies located elsewhere.
a. Options Available to Foreign Liquidators in the U.K.
Foreign liquidators have a number of means by which to regulate
or influence the conduct of a debtor company's U.K. affairs. If liquida-
tion proceedings have been commenced in a territory outside the United
Kingdom and the reach of Section 426, the foreign liquidator may peti-
tion the English courts for an administration order under the Insol-
vency Act.1
57
The liquidator also may seek an order staying all U.K. actions and
executions of judgments against the debtor company. English courts
have inherent jurisdiction to stay actions, particularly in the context of
foreign jurisdictional matters. However, in order to justify a stay of
English proceedings, (a) there must be another forum to whose jurisdic-
tion the defendant is amenable in which justice can be done between
the parties at substantially less inconvenience or expense, and (b) the
stay must not deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate personal or juridical
advantage which would be available to him if he invoked the jurisdic-
tion of the English court.
2 58 "
As a third alternative, the foreign liquidator may claim title to the
debtor company's U.K. assets by seeking an appointment as receiver of
those assets259 or by asserting a foreign court's order vesting title in the
assets in his name.26 ° In the Queensland case of In re Young, the court
1 But see Insolvency Act § 9(1). For a discussion on administration orders and
their application to insurance and reinsurance companies, see Anderson, supra note
177.
258 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 202, at 389-96 ("Where the case falls within
the scope of the [Convention] the English court (a) must decline jurisdiction if the
proceedings involve the same cause of action and are between the same parties and the
courts of another Contracting State have been first seised of the action, and (b) may
stay its proceedings where the courts of another Contracting State have been first seised
of a related action which has not been the subject of a judgment."). Note that com-
mencement of administration proceedings under the Insolvency Act effects a stay
against actions and execution proceedings. Insolvency Act § 10.
259 See, e.g., Re IIT [1976] 58 D.L.R.(3d) 55; Supreme Court Act 1981 § 37(1)
("The court may by order ... appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the
court to be just and convenient to do so."). Supreme Court Act 1981 § 37(2) ("Any
such order may be made either unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the
court thinks just.").
260 Bergerem v. Marsh [1921] B. & C.R. 195, 197; In re Kooperman [1928] B. &
C.R. 49; Pelegrin v. Coutts & Co., [1915] 1 Ch. 696; but see Schemmer v. Property
Resources Ltd. [1975] 1 Ch. 273. Note that the authority of a liquidator appointed
under the law of the place of incorporation of the debtor company is recognized in
England. DIcEY & MORRIS, supra note 202, at 1150. See also H. Picaroa, The Law
Relating to Receivers, Managers and Administrators, at 499 ("As a rule an appoint-
ment by a court in the place of incorporation of a company will be recognized but not if
the receiver was appointed by way of equitable execution. Although Goulding, J., in
19911
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stated that:
It would seem therefore that a receiver appointed by a Cali-
fornian court under the provisions of Californian law to the
possession of Queensland property of a person over whom
the Californian law had jurisdiction would be entitled to col-
lect that property and give a good exchange therefor.2"'
Another alternative available to foreign liquidators is to invoke the
benefits of compulsory liquidation proceedings in England. It is well
established that insolvency proceedings may be initiated in the English
courts notwithstanding the fact that insolvency proceedings have al-
ready commenced with respect to the same debtor company in its coun-
try of incorporation or elsewhere.262 However, if liquidation proceed-
ings have commenced in a foreign court, liquidation proceedings in
England will be stayed on the grounds of forum non conveniens if the
foreign court is the appropriate forum for the administration of the liq-
uidation.26 English courts must consider the interests of the litigants
Schemmer's case declined to express a view on the point an appointment in the jurisdic-
tion where a company has established its central management and control would proba-
bly be recognized. It might even be the case that if the law of the company's place of
incorporation would recognize the receivership order, an English court would do so.").
However, whether the order of the foreign court vests title in U.K. assets in the foreign
liquidator is entirely a question of fact. Re IIT [1979] 58 D.L.R.(3d) 55; Macaulay v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York [1927] 44 T.L.R. 99 (the court gave effect to such an
order with respect to the debtor's U.K. moveable property, that is, the credit balance of
the debtor company's account at its bank in London). Note that in Schemmer, supra
the court declined to define when English courts must recognize a foreign receiver's title
to U.K. assets. See also Primary Producers Bank of Australia v. Hughes [1931] N.S.W.
St. R. 14, 18 ("A liquidator appointed in the country of domicile has the power of
collecting in a foreign country the assets of the company situated there, but that is not
by virtue of any title in himself or of any trust attaching to the assets of which he is the
trustee, but because by virtue of the law of the country of the company's domicile, he
has the sole right of using the company's name in litigation.").
261 [1955] Q. St. R. 254, 263.
262 In re Suidair Int'l Airways [1951] Ch. 165; Schemmers, supra note 260; Re
Young [1955] Q. St. R. 254; In re Compania Merabello San Nicholas S.A. [1973] 1
Ch. 75; Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky) v. Kindersley [1950] 2
All. E.R. 549 (liquidation proceedings may be commenced in a U.K. court in relation
to U.K. assets of a foreign debtor company after the existence of that company has
ceased under local law). It should be noted that under Section 145 of the Insolvency
Act, the court may, on the application of the liquidator, direct that all or any part of
the debtor company's property shall vest in the liquidator in his official name. Other-
wise, the property remains vested in the name of the debtor company on trust for the
benefit of its creditors. Also note that under Section 125(1) of the Insolvency Act "[o]n
hearing a winding-up petition the court may dismiss it, or adjourn the hearing condi-
tionally or unconditionally, or make an interim order, or any other order that it thinks
fit; but the court shall not refuse to make a winding-up order on the ground only that
the company's assets have been mortgaged to an amount equal to or in excess of those
assets, or that the company has no assets."
263 See generally Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] 1 A.C. 460.
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and justice in determining which is the appropriate forum for liquida-
tion proceedings. The position of English creditors who have priority
under English insolvency law but not under the foreign insolvency law
is only one factor to be considered in such a determination.
As manifested in the four procedures available to foreign liquida-
tors, the universality theory or "doctrine of unity" is favored in English
Law, subject to certain qualifications. 64 However, application of the
universality theory is qualified. On the one hand, concurrent liquida-
tion proceedings in England relating to a foreign debtor company are
deemed ancillary to the domiciliary liquidation proceedings.265 But on
See also BUTLER & MERKIN, supra note 179, at D.4.1-45 (citing Spiliada Maritime
Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd. [1986] 3 All E.R. 843:
(1) A stay will be granted on the ground of forum non conveniens only
where the court is satisfied that there is some other available forum which
both has jurisdiction and is appropriate for the trial in the sense that the
case could be tried more suitably in the interests of all the parties and of
justice. (2) The burden of persuading the court to grant a stay rests upon
the defendant in the English proceedings. However, where particular mat-
ters are raised to justify a forum, the party raising the matter bears the
burden of establishing it. If it has been established to the satisfaction of the
court that there is another, more appropriate forum, the plaintiff in the
English proceedings bears the burden of proving that the trial should nev-
ertheless take place in England. (3) The defendant's burden of proof is not
just to show that England is not the natural or appropriate forum, but to
establish the existence of an alternative and more appropriate forum. This
approach would emphasise that the defendant is seeking to deprive the
plaintiff of his right to proceed in England and would also further the
cause of international comity. (4) The court is to look initially at factors
pointing towards another forum. Relevant factors demonstrating the avail-
ability of another forum include: (a) convenience and expense (e.g. availa-
bility of witnesses); (b) the proper law of the transaction in dispute; and
(c) the places where the parties reside or carry on business. (5) If there is
no evidence that any other forum is more convenient, a stay of the English
proceedings will ordinarily be refused. (6) However, if the evidence dem-
onstrates that there is another, more appropriate, forum for the trial, a
stay will ordinarily be granted unless justice requires a stay to be refused.
The plaintiff will, therefore, be permitted to proceed if it is shown that he
would not obtain justice in the more appropriate forum.).
26 The universality theory is similar to the doctrine of comity. See Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) ("'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other."). Thus, the U.S. doctrine of comity would allow for the universal recognition of
foreign liquidation proceedings, while at the same time recognizing the territorialist
application of domestic laws in order to protect domestic creditors. This approach is
substantially similar to the approach taken by English courts in relation to ancillary
liquidations.
165 See Primary Producers Bank of Australia Ltd. v. Hughes [1931] N.S.W. St.
R. 14, 17:
It is well settled that where a company is in process of liquidation in
various jurisdictions, the liquidation in the country of its domicile is the
main liquidation and that the others should be treated as ancillary thereto,
and that distribution will not be made of the assets in the ancillary liqui-
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the other hand, English courts appear concerned to ensure that liquida-
tors of foreign companies appointed in English proceedings should not
interfere with the debtor company's foreign affairs without special
direction.266
b. Conduct of Ancillary U.K. Proceedings
If domiciliary liquidation proceedings have commenced abroad and
"ancillary" proceedings have commenced in England, the English court
may assist the foreign liquidator by first distributing the debtor com-
pany's U.K. assets to satisfy the claims of creditors having priority
under English law,267 and then transfer any remaining assets to the
foreign liquidator.6 8 English courts grant such assistance having regard
for the relevant facts and circumstances. Generally, any sensible ar-
rangements between English and foreign liquidators which benefit En-
glish creditors 6 9 will be sanctioned by English courts so long as the
arrangements adhere to the following general principles:
(a) Preferred creditors, that is creditors having priority
under English insolvency law, receive payment out of the
debtor company's U.K. assets in priority to all other credi-
tors, wherever located;
(b) The remaining U.K. assets are then distributed equally
among the non-preferred creditors, wherever located; and
(c) Any non-preferred creditor who has received a payment
out of the debtor company's assets by seizing or attaching
assets in other jurisdictions must, before benefiting from an
equal distribution of assets with other like creditors, account
dation except in co-ordination with the distribution taking place in the
country of the company's domicile.
Although the term "ancillary jurisdiction" is often used, there is little discussion of
what it is intended to mean. See In re Commercial Bank of South Australia [1886] 33
Ch. D. 174, 178.
In England, the term might be used to describe English proceedings which have
been commenced to assist a foreign liquidator. See In re Suidair Int'l Airways [1951] 1
Ch. 165; In re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch. 385, 394:
("One knows that where there is a liquidation of one concern the general
principle is-ascertain what is the domicil of the company in liquidation;
let the Court of the country of domicil act as the principal Court to govern
the liquidation; and let the other Courts act as ancillary, as far as they
can, to the principal liquidation.").
260 In re Commercial Bank of South Australia [1886] 33 Ch. D. 174, 178.
267 Id.; In re Suidair Int'l Airways [1951] 1 Ch. 165.
268 In re Hibernian Merchants Ltd. [1958] 1 Ch. 76.
269 See Woloniecki, supra note 239, at 661, 662; In re P. MacFadyan & Co. ex
parte Vizianagaram Co. [1907] 1 K.B. 675.
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for the assets seized or attached. 270
This is commonly referred to as the "hotchpot rule."
A transfer of assets from England to a foreign liquidator ap-
pointed in the domiciliary jurisdiction will not be sanctioned if the as-
sets are to be used to pay the foreign liquidator's costs. Nor will En-
glish courts sanction a transfer which results in a demotion of the rights
of U.K. creditors. For example, as noted above, in United States liqui-
dation proceedings, policyholders have priority over reinsurance credi-
tors, whereas in English liquidation proceedings insurance and reinsur-
ance creditors are treated equally.271 Accordingly, English courts will
not sanction a transfer of U.K. assets to a U.S. liquidator of a U.S.
debtor company which wrote both insurance and reinsurance business
because U.K. reinsurance creditors would be prejudiced. Similarly, a
United States liquidator's request to have concurrent U.K. liquidation
proceedings declared ancillary to United States liquidation proceedings
will fail for the same reason.272 Nevertheless, United States reinsurance
creditors may seek to liquidate the United States debtor company in the
United Kingdom. Upon payment of claims in the United Kingdom pro-
ceedings, the United States reinsurance creditors would receive the
same distributions as U.K. insurance and reinsurance creditors, except
that the U.S. reinsurance creditors may have to account for the value of
any assets seized or attached in the United States or paid to them in
any United States proceedings.
270 See Woloniecki, supra note 239, at 662 (citing In re English, Scottish & Aus-
tralian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch. 385, at 394; In re Oriental Inland Steam Co.
[1874] 9 Ch. App. 557; Banco de Portugal v. Waddell [1880] 5 App. Gas. 161; Re
Alfred Shaw & Co. ex parte Mackenzie [1897] 8 Q.W. 93; Primary Producers Bank of
Australia v. Hughes [1931] 32 S.R. (N.S.W.) 14, at 19; In re Standard Insurance Co.
[1968] Q.R. 118; In re Northland Services Pty Ltd. [1978] 18 Aus. L.R. 684. See also
Transnational Aspects, supra note 3, at 1147:
Provided ... it can be demonstrated that the insolvency laws in the coun-
try of incorporation, where the principal liquidation is conducted, are sub-
stantially the same as in the UK, and that UK creditors will not be un-
fairly prejudiced by submitting to the foreign jurisdiction, then the Court
can make an Order designating the UK liquidation as being ancillary to
the principal liquidation overseas. The UK liquidator in those circum-
stances will effectively restrict his activities to assisting the foreign liquida-
tion, for instance by collecting UK debts and agreeing the claims of UK
creditors. Proceeds from collections in the UK, subject to the costs of the
liquidation and after the payment of any claims from UK preferential
creditors, will then be remitted to the principal liquidator, who will create
a common fund out of which the claims of all unsecured creditors will be
met pari passu.
271 Insolvency Act §§ 175, 386, sched. 6.
'72 The British Approach, supra note 179, at 653.
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2.6. Review
As demonstrated above, English law of insurance insolvency is es-
sentially universalist in approach, subject to territorialist inroads. It re-
mains to be considered in this article how the two theories are mani-
fested in the law of Canada, a principal trading party of both the
United States and the United Kingdom.
3. CANADIAN LAW
The Canadian approach to international liquidations has been de-
scribed as the "plurality doctrine." This doctrine is regarded as repre-
senting a compromise between the territorialist and universalist ap-
proaches,2 7 3 and is premised on the belief that "bankruptcies should
essentially be an extension of the private law which exists between the
insolvent debtor and the creditors. ' 27 4 Under this approach it is accept-
able to initiate separate bankruptcy proceedings in different jurisdic-
tions (i.e., inside and outside Canada), if necessary, with each court
applying the forum's substantive law to the proceedings initiated
there .27  At first blush, this approach seems more closely aligned to the
territoriality theory, but no matter how it is categorized, the Canadian
approach to the liquidation of insurance companies appears to welcome
ancillary proceedings.
3.1. Overview
The Canadian federal government has jurisdiction over the incor-
poration, registration and winding-up of domestic and foreign insur-
ance companies. The governing federal entities are the Minister of Fi-
nance, the Superintendent of Insurance, and the Department of
Insurance. The governing federal statutes are the Canadian and British
Insurance Companies Act ("CBICA"),7 6 the Foreign Insurance Com-
panies Act ("FICA"),1 and the Winding-Up Act ("WUA"). 78 The
2" Harding, Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd.: A Canadian Approach to Some Specific
Problems in the Adjudication of International Insolvencies, 12 DALHouSIE L.J. 412,
419 (1989).
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 R.S.C. ch. 1-12 (1985). In general, the CBICA contains separate but symmet-
rical provisions governing the incorporation, registration and winding-up of Canadian,
British and foreign insurance companies transacting life insurance business, fraternal
benefit societies, and all other companies transacting insurance other than life
insurance.
277 R.S.C. ch. 1-13 (1985).
278 R.S.C. ch. W-1 1 (1985). Like the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, insurance companies
may not be debtors under the Canadian Bankruptcy Act. R.S.C. ch. B-3, § 2 (1985).
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CBICA, FICA and WUA provide mechanisms for resolving the finan-
cial difficulties of domestic and foreign insurance and reinsurance
279
companies: i.e., control, rehabilitation, winding-up and liquidation.
280
This paper focuses on winding-up proceedings.
3.2. Winding-Up Proceedings Against a Domestic Company
The WUA establishes procedures for winding-up domestic compa-
nies with three purposes in mind: (1) to provide for an equitable and
ratable distribution of the assets of a company among its creditors with-
out preference; (2) to protect the debtor from harassment by its credi-
tors; and (3) to prevent the piecemeal realization of the debtor's as-
sets.28' A domestic insurance company may be wound-up if (i) efforts
to rehabilitate the company would be futile,282 or (ii) the company is
insolvent.28 Canada's various provinces are auxiliary* to one another
279 Reinsurance appears to be part of the business of insurance within the mean-
ing of the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act. Section 16 states that: "[t]he
company may cause itself to be reinsured against any risk undertaken by it, and may
reinsure any other insurer against any risk undertaken by that other insurer if the risk
is of a class of insurance that the Company is registered to transact." R.S.C. ch. 1-12, §
16 (1985). See also R.S.C. ch. 1-12, §§ 128 (1985) (authorizing a reduction in the
reserves of a Canadian company for reinsurance, and specifying the security posting
requirements applicable to registered and unregistered reinsurers), 201(7) (same as re-
spects British companies).
280 Insurance insolvency proceedings generally follow a review of the particular
insurance company's financial status. Insurance companies are required to file annual
statements of their operations with the Department of Insurance. R.S.C. ch. 1-12, §§
104 (1985) (Canadian companies), 211 (British companies); R.S.C. ch. 1-13, § 30
(1985) (other foreign companies). Before a company's registration may be renewed, the
Superintendent must examine the statement and report to the Minister whether the
company is in a condition to meet its liabilities. R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 107(b) (1985). The
Superintendent must report to the Minister any case where the Superintendent believes
that a company's liabilities presently exceed its assets (or likely will within the follow-
ing year), or where the company's assets are insufficient to adequately protect policy-
holders. R.S.C. ch. 1-12, §§ 154 (1985) (Canadian life insurance companies), 175 (Ca-
nadian companies transacting insurance business other than life), 227 (British
companies); R.S.C. ch. 1-13, § 65 (1985) (other foreign companies). If the Minister
agrees, he may then impose conditions or limitations on the company's registration,
prescribe a time within which the company must make good any deficiency, or direct
the Superintendent to take control of the company's Canadian assets. Id. If the com-
pany does not make good the deficiency, the Minister may request that the Attorney
General of Canada apply to a superior court for an order directing the Superintendent
to rehabilitate or wind-up the Company. R.S.C. ch. 1-12, §§ 57 (1985) (the CBICA
provides: "The company is subject to any general Act for the winding-up of compa-
nies"), 155, 157 (Canadian life insurance companies), 176 (Canadian companies trans-
acting insurance business other than life), 183, 184 (all Canadian companies), 228
(British companies).
2' Carfagnini, The Winding-Up Act, 66 CANADIAN BANKR. 77, 79 (1988).
282 R.S.C. ch. 1-12, §§ 157 (1985) (Canadian life insurance companies), 176 (Ca-
nadian companies transacting business other than life).
282 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 160(2) (1985). An insurance company is deemed insolvent
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for the purpose of winding-up a business, and proceedings relating to
such a winding-up can be transferred from one court to another."8 4
3.2.1. Automatic Stay
Issuance of the winding-up order gives rise to a stay: no suit or
other legal action may proceed or be commenced against the company,
except with leave of the court and upon such terms as the court or-
ders.285 Before the order is entered, the company, its creditors, or con-
tributories (that is, debtors of the insolvent)286 may apply for restraint
of any action, suit or proceeding against the company.287 The stay
serves two important functions: first, creditors are compelled to come in
and share ratably; and second, the stay ensures summary disposition of
claims, thereby preventing the assets from being consumed by litigation
costs and expenses. 2 8 The breadth of the stay is limited to assets lo-
cated in Canada; in order for an insolvent Canadian insurer to protect
its foreign assets it must obtain a stay wherever the assets are
located.289
3.2.2. Appointment, Duties and Powers of Liquidators
Pursuant to the winding-up order, the court will appoint a liqui-
dator after notice to creditors, contributories, shareholders or mem-
bers.290 Upon appointment, the liquidator has custody and control of all
if the company fails to pay any undisputed claim within 90 days or a disputed claim
after final judgment, or if the company's certificate of registry remains unrenewed more
than 30 days past expiration or withdrawal. Id. Either omission suggests that the com-
pany's assets are inadequate to protect the claims of potential policyholders. See Attor-
ney General of Canada v. Cardinal Ins. Co., 39 O.R.2d 204, 209 (1982). Therefore,
the Minister of Finance may request the Attorney General of Canada to apply to the
court for an order that the company be wound-up. R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 160(2) (1985).
In response to such an application, the company is entitled to negotiate to sell its assets
or reinsure its business (R.S.C. ch. 1-42, § 160 (1985)), or oppose the winding-up order
and defeat it by demonstrating that its default was only temporary and thus not an
indication of insolvency. R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 14 (1985).
284 R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 183 (1985).
288 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 21 (1985).
288 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 2 (1985).
287 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 17 (1985). In fact, the court may arrest "any contributory
or past or present director, manager, etc. of the company who is about to quit Canada
or otherwise abscond" with company funds. R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 117 (1985).
288 Carson v. Montreal Trust Co., 23 D.L.R. 690, 692 (N.S.S. Ct. 1915).
288 See In re Sefel Geophysical Ltd., 62 Alta.L.R.2d 193, 70 C. Bankr. (N.S.) 97
(Q.B. 1988). Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, discussed in Part 1.3 above,
assists the liquidator in achieving such a result in U.S. courts. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
290 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 23 (1985). The court, however, may itself discharge the
functions of a liquidator. R.S.C. ch. W-11, §§ 48, 49 (1985).
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property," 1 effects and choses in action to which the company is enti-
tled, and all powers of the directors of the company cease.2"2 The liqui-
dator does not, however, take title to the assets.
2 93
The WUA empowers the liquidator to make any compromises or
arrangements the liquidator deems expedient.294 As in England, credi-
tors of a financially troubled insurer are given the opportunity to fash-
ion a remedy - such as a "compromise" or "arrangement" - to re-
solve the company's difficulties.295
3.2.3. Claims
Within sixty days after appointment, the liquidator must "prepare
a statement of all the persons appearing by the company's books and
records to be creditors of the company or claimants under any pol-
icy." '296 The liquidator must then publish notice of his intent to file the
statement in the Canadian Gazette and other Canadian papers.297
Claimants who are not listed on the original statement must timely no-
tify the liquidator of their claims. Creditors may object to the liquida-
tor's statement,298 which may then be amended. 299 Only those claimants
listed in the final statement will share in the assets of the company, up
to the approved value of their claims."° However, where the assets are
not sufficient to cover all claims appearing in the statement in full, "the
policyholders are not barred from any recourse they have, either in law
or in equity," against the company or any shareholder or director
291 Such property includes special deposits (R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 76 (1985)) and
"separate funds" (R.S.C. ch. 1-12, §§ 68-70 (1985)), which are to be liquidated sepa-
rately in winding-up proceedings. R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 70(2) (1985).
'9' R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 33 (1985).
293 See Carfagnini, supra note 281, at 91-95.
29 R.S.C. ch. W-11, §§ 38, 65 (1985).
2" The court may summon meetings of the company's creditors, contributories,
shareholders, or members for the purpose of ascertaining their wishes. R.S.C. ch. W-
11, § 63 (1985). In order for a compromise in value or arrangement to be adopted, a
meeting of all creditors must be arranged and threequarters in value of the creditors
voting in person or by proxy must approve the arrangement. R.S.C. ch. W-1 1, §§ 65,
66 (1985). If approved, the arrangement "is binding on all the creditors... and also on
the liquidator and contributories of the company." R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 66 (1985).
296 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 166(1) (1985). The statement'must show the amount of
each claim (including contingent and unliquidated claims, R.S.C. ch. W-1 1, §§ 71, 163
(1985)) and each claimant must be collocated and ranked according to amount. R.S.C.
ch. W-11, § 166(2) (1985).
291 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 168 (1985).
299 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 166(3) (1985).
299 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 166(4) (1985).
300 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 166(4) (1985). See Re A.G. Can and Northumberland
General Ins., 56 O.R.2d 609 (High Ct. of J. 1986).
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thereof.301
The foregoing procedures for filing claims are territorialistic. Al-
though fair and adequate for apprising Canadian creditors of their
rights,302 foreign creditors who do not receive the published notice are
disadvantaged in protecting their claims on the company's assets.
As in the United States and the United Kingdom, secured creditors
may rely on their security and cannot be compelled to file a claim
under the WUA.3 0 1 Canadian courts have consistently held that under
the WUA, secured creditors may:
(1) stand outside the liquidation proceedings and realize
upon their security in any manner authorized by law [with-
out recourse for any deficiency];
(2) release their security to the liquidator and prove their
claim as an unsecured creditor; or
(3) come into the liquidation proceedings, value their secur-
ity [in any initial distribution of assets] and prove their claim
for any deficiency as an unsecured creditor [in any future
distribution of assets].304
If the secured creditor elects to participate in the liquidation proceed-
ings, however, he will be subject to the procedures of the WUA.30 ' In
that event, the liquidator may either consent to the creditor's retention
of the security or require that the creditor deliver and assign the secur-
ity to the liquidator.306
3.2.4. Marshalling and Distributing Assets
The Canadian law respecting the marshalling and distribution of
assets is universalist in approach. A Canadian liquidator may require
that all funds and securities of the Canadian insurance company -
wherever situated - be transferred to the liquidator to. facilitate a
proper distribution of the assets to all of the company's policyholders in
accordance with the WUA's priority ranking scheme.307 The court has
301 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 167 (1985).
302 The publication employed to convey notice is the Canadian Gazette and other
Canadian papers. R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 168 (1985).
SO Re Brampton Gas Co., 4 O.L.R. 509, 518 (Ont. Div. Ct. 1902); R.S.C. ch.
W-11, §§ 78-84 (1985).
304 Carfagnini, supra note 281, at 97; R.S.C. ch. W-11, §§ 78-84 (1985).
305 Re Brampton Gas Co., 4 O.L.R. at 518.
so3 R.S.C. ch. W-11, §§ 79, 87 (1985).
307 R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 164 (1985). Claims are paid in the following order of
priority:
(a) first, costs of liquidation;
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broad powers to aid the liquidator's marshalling of assets.308 Moreover,
if a foreign state or country refuses to transfer requested funds or se-
curities, the policyholders in that foreign jurisdiction have no right to
claim any share of the assets of the company other than the funds de-
posited in their jurisdiction.3 0 9 Thus, Canadian law pressures foreign
receivers to participate in a unified insolvency proceeding.
If a foreign creditor does not transfer its security back to the Ca-
nadian liquidator, and if the creditor's claim is prioritized more favora-
bly under its own jurisdiction's priority ranking scheme than under the
WUA, the creditor may well benefit by its refusal to transfer funds to
the liquidator. For example, in In re Sefel Geophysical Ltd. 1° a
troubled Canadian company obtained a stay of proceedings against all
creditors. Because the majority of the assets were located in the United
States, the company sought a similar stay in the United States to pre-
vent the U.S. revenue authorities from attaching the company's United
States assets. Under the Canadian Bankruptcy Act and the WUA, a
foreign revenue claim would not be paid in a winding-up proceeding,
while under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code a federal tax claim would gen-
erally receive preferential treatment. Based on equitable principles, the
court held that the preferred status accorded to claimants under Ameri-
can bankruptcy law should be honored by the Canadian liquidation
court. This holding coincides with the prevailing "plurality doctrine,"
which acknowledges and gives effect to the laws of the ancillary
jurisdiction.
3.3. Proceedings Involving Foreign Corporations Having Canadian
Assets or Creditors
Canada has enacted legislative provisions which specifically ad-
(b) secondly, claims of preferred creditors;
(c) thirdly, claims of policyholders ranking as follows: claims that have
arisen under the policies of the insurance company prior to the date of the
filing of the Statement, and claims of policy-holders to the value of their
policies computed as providing in the Winding-Up Act; and
(d) lastly, creditors other than policy-holders, reinsurers and preferred
creditors are entitled to receive a dividend on their claims only if the assets
are more than sufficient to pay the claims in subparagraphs (a), (b) and
(c) above.
R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 161 (1985). See also Carfagnini, supra note 281, at 89.
The expenses of administration are payable out of sums appropriated by Parlia-
ment, for which domestic and foreign registered companies may be assessed. R.S.C. ch.
1-12, § 186 (1985). Assessed companies have a claim against the insolvent's assets with
priority over shareholder claims. R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 188 (1985).
308 See generally R.S.C. ch. W-11, §§ 108-35 (1985).
... R.S.C. ch. W-11, § 164(3) (1985).
810 62 Alta.L.R.2d 193, 70 C.Bankr. 97 (Q.B. 1988).
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dress some of the issues that arise when a non-Canadian insurance
company with Canadian assets or creditors is placed into receivership.
As discussed below, the nature and placement of such assets is governed
by statute, as is judicial recognition of foreign receivership proceedings
and judgements and opportunities for Canadian receivership of foreign
insurers.
3.3.1. Registration Requirements
Under the CBICA and the FICA, a foreign company cannot
transact the business of insurance in Canada unless it is registered, 3"
posts a deposit of securities, 12 and maintains assets in Canada in an
amount required for its class of insurance business. 313 This is generally
accomplished by vesting securities in the name of a trustee under a
trust indenture.31 4 Claims against such assets often arise where the
company is being liquidated abroad or where the company is subjected
to liquidation in Canada.
3.3.2. Foreign Liquidation Proceedings
Canadian laws governing foreign insolvency proceedings against
foreign debtors is essentially universalist. Thus, the courts of all Cana-
dian provinces (except Quebec) will give effect to a foreign liquidation
order, provided it was issued by the jurisdiction in which the foreign
company was formed.315 Recognition will not be refused because the
foreign jurisdiction does not afford reciprocal recognition to Canadian
liquidation orders.31 6 Thus, if so ordered by the debtor's court, the for-
eign company's Canadian assets may be transferred to the company's
312 R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 195 (1985) (British companies); R.S.C. ch. 1-13, § 4 (1985)
(other foreign companies).
312 R.S.C. ch. 1-13, § 7 (1985).
313 R.S.C. ch. 1-12, §§ 200 (1985) (British life insurance companies), 201 (British
companies transacting insurance business other than life insurance); R.S.C. ch. 1-13, §§
12 (1985) (foreign life insurance companies), 14 (foreign companies transacting insur-
ance other than life insurance). This amount can be reduced where the risk is reinsured
(R.S.C. ch. 1-13, § 15 (1985)), or there is an excess. R.S.C. ch. 1-13, § 26 (1985). A
letter of credit may be posted in lieu of assets. R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 207 (1985) (British
companies).
314 R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 209 (1985) (British companies); R.S.C. ch. 1-13, § 28
(1985) (other foreign companies). Interest on the securities is transferred to the com-
pany so long as the requirements of FICA have not been violated. R.S.C. ch. 1-13, § 27
(1985).
$15 In re C.A. Kennedy Co. and Stibbe-Monk Ltd., 14 O.R.2d 439, 445, 74
D.L.R.3d 87, 92-93 (H. Ct. Div. 1976).
316 Williams v. Rice and Rice Knitting Mills, 3 D.L.R. 225, 36 Man. R. 266, 7
C.Bankr. 699 (K.B. 1926).
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domiciliary liquidator.3 17 Such transfers conform with the principles of
international comity, by which Canadian courts give effect to the orders
of foreign courts.
In re C.A. Kennedy Co. and Stibbe-Monk Ltd.3a 8 illustrates the
Canadian approach to enforcement of foreign liquidation orders. C.A.
Kennedy Company, a Canadian entity, obtained judgment in Ontario
against Stibbe-Monk Limited, an English company, and obtained a
garnishee order attaching all debts which Dorothea Knitting Mills
Limited, another Canadian company, owed to Stibbe-Monk. Stibbe-
Monk had previously obtained a loan and granted its lender a floating
charge or assignment on all of the company's assets, which included the
Dorothea obligation. Stibbe-Monk's lender appointed a receiver in
England for the company, and notice of the appointment was sent to all
of its creditors. The trial court directed that Dorothea pay into the
court the debt due to Stibbe-Monk. The issue before the High Court of
Justice was whether it should recognize the receiver's right to the funds
under English law. The court determined that it should, holding that
an assignment made to a receiver in a foreign jurisdiction is entitled to
recognition.' 9 Therefore, C.A. Kennedy's attempted garnishment
failed.
3.3.3. Canadian Liquidation of a Foreign Insurer
In contrast to the Canadian approach to foreign insolvency pro-
ceedings against foreign debtors, the Canadian approach to domestic
liquidations of foreign debtors is territorialistic.
A foreign company may be liquidated in Canada even if liquida-
tion proceedings have not been commenced in the insurer's country of
domicile. The Superintendent of Insurance may take control of the as-
sets of a company when he believes that the company's assets are not
accounted for satisfactorily, the company has failed to pay an outstand-
ing liability, or there exists any practice or state of affairs that are prej-
udicial to Canadian policyholders or creditors.320 Once the Superinten-
dent takes control, the Minister of Finance may request that the
Attorney General of Canada apply for an order to wind-up the com-
pany's business in Canada under the WUA."2' Once such an order is
31 R.S.C. ch. I.-13, § 452(b) (1985).
318 14 O.R.2d 439, 445, 74 D.L.R.3d 87 (H. Ct. Div. 1976).
319 Id., 14 O.R.2d at 448.
320 R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 227 (1985) (British companies); R.S.C. ch. I.-13, § 64.1
(1985) (1st Supp. § 127) (other foreign insurers).
321 R.S.C. ch. 1-12, § 227 (1985) (British companies); R.S.C. ch. I.-13, § 66(2)
(1985) (1st Supp. § 129) (other foreign insurers).
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obtained, a liquidator is appointed to wind-up the company's affairs as
if the company was a Canadian domiciliary, pursuant to the winding-
up provisions of the WUA. Assets maintained in Canada are part of
the company's general assets, available pari passu to all policyholders
in Canada.122 Thus, Canadian creditors are protected from a dissipa-
tion of assets located in Canada and benefit from the Canadian priority
ranking scheme.
3.3.4. Concurrent Liquidation Orders
Even if foreign liquidation proceedings have been instituted in the
company's domiciliary jurisdiction, creditors or foreign liquidators may
initiate concurrent liquidation proceedings in Canada. This may occur
where Canadian legislation is more advantageous to a Canadian credi-
tor, or where the foreign liquidation proceedings have no extraterrito-
rial effect. 28 A concurrent order would operate as ancillary to a foreign
order. 24 However, in Canada the term "ancillary" appears to connote
that each jurisdiction will distribute the assets situated therein accord-
ing to its own law, and thus is closely aligned with the territoriality
theory. Therefore, unless a vesting order is obtained by the foreign liq-
uidator, Canadian law will be applied to issues such as the admission
of claims, claims priority, stay of proceedings, and the voidability of
transactions.
2 5
At the conclusion of the winding-up of a foreign insurance com-
pany in Canada, all surplus assets are distributed among those
entitled.
32 6
4. CONCLUSIONS
Searching for a forum concursus is the perennial task of receivers.
In the best of all worlds, where there is one debtor with an identifiable
group of assets, those assets would be distributed to creditors on an
equal basis in a single proceeding. The problems engendered by differ-
ences in the laws of competing jurisdictions, however, make that task
nearly impossible to accomplish. This is especially true in the case of
2 R.S.C. ch. 1-12, §§ 219 (1985) (British companies), 208 (British mutual fire
insurance company).
3"2 See Grace, Law of Liquidations: The Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Liquidation Orders in Canada and Australia-A Critical Comparison, 35 INT'L
COMP. L.Q., 666, 667 (1986).
324 Id. at 680; accord In re Hibernian Merchants Ltd. [1958] 1 Oh. 76.
322 Grace, supra note 323, at 680.
32' R.S.C. ch. W-11, §§ 138, 139 (1985).
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an insolvent insurance company. Most jurisdictions require that before
an insurer may transact business within its borders, the insurer must
post security or make a deposit to protect policyholders in that jurisdic-
tion. When the insurer becomes insolvent, there is an immediate crys-
tallization of divergent interests in different jurisdictions: each creditor
wants his due, and the company's receiver - or the courts - must
resolve these competing interests.
The insolvency of multinational insurance companies requires a
global solution. Adoption of legislation embodying principles of the uni-
versalist theory offers the best hope for achieving such a solution. Ter-
ritorialist procedures hamper the efforts of receivers to marshal and dis-
tribute the assets of insolvent insurers in an efficient, equitable manner.
Nevertheless, jurisdictions have justifiable concerns for protecting the
rights of their constituents. The task placed before international receiv-
ers, therefore, is to fashion a universalist procedure which strikes a bal-
ance between protecting such individuals' rights and the rights of all
creditors to equal treatment. As discussed at length in this article, each
of England, Canada and the 50 states and territories of the U.S., as
well as the federal government, has endeavored to strike that balance.
In the United States, uniform and model legislation has been cre-
ated which attempts to address the myriad issues arising from multina-
tional insurance insolvencies. The UILA and the Model Act are both
universalist in approach. Each facilitates the administration of the es-
tates of multi-jurisdictional insurers through the establishment of domi-
ciliary and ancillary receivers. Yet each act also embodies territorialist
limitations, such as the protection afforded to the rights of special de-
posit claimants. Implementation of the universalist goals of the acts is
accomplished by according reciprocal treatment to signatory jurisdic-
tions. Although at first blush reciprocity appears to be a territorialist
limitation - since non-signatory jurisdictions may be deprived of the
benefits of the signatories' laws - it in fact serves as one of the means
for effectuating cooperative and complementary proceedings among ju-
risdictions with potentially competing interests. Unfortunately, neither
act has been adopted by all United States jurisdictions.
Against the backdrop of such diversity lies Section 304 of the fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code. The principal advantage of this legislation is its
universal application to all of the American states and territories, and
its accessibility to foreign receivers. The principal limitation of Section
304 derives from its inability to resolve problems attendant to multina-
tional insurance insolvencies. As part of the Bankruptcy Code, Section
304 simply does not contemplate the unique circumstances presented by
an insurance insolvency.
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English legal procedures applicable to cross-border insolvencies
may be criticized for encouraging English courts to weigh the interests
and demands of U.K. creditors against those of foreign liquidators and
creditors. The territorialist underpinnings of Mareva injunctions and
disclosure orders thus compromise the fundamental principle that all
creditors should be afforded fair and equal treatment. In contrast, Sec-
tion 426 of the Companies Act is universalist legislation. Like the
American Section 304, it facilitates conjunctive administration of an in-
solvent's estate. Unfortunately, the application of Section 426 is limited
to the United Kingdom and certain designated countries.
Canadian law, too, is essentially universalist in approach, with a
smattering of territorialist protections. Like Sections 304 and 426, it
empowers foreign receivers to marshal Canadian assets for administra-
tion and distribution in a foreign proceeding; this is so even if the for-
eign jurisdiction does not afford reciprocal recognition of Canadian or-
ders, a unique extension beyond the limitations imposed on Sections
304 and 426. Similarly, domestic receivers may demand return to Ca-
nada of all funds and securities held in foreign lands, and in appropri-
ate circumstances, Canadian courts will respect foreign priority of dis-
tribution law. The territorialist aspects of Canadian law are evident,
however, in its provisions governing domestic and ancillary liquidations
of foreign insurers.
In anticipation of the inevitable reduction in size of the interna-
tional insurance and reinsurance markets and the increase in the num-
ber of cross-border insolvencies, simplicity and consolidation of laws
governing cross-border insolvency is essential. Unambiguous legislative
action is required to provide receivers with the opportunity to under-
stand their respective rights, powers and duties. Only then will the law
best serve all courts, receivers and creditors in avoiding conflicts and
strained relations when confronted with cross-border insurance insol-
vencies. Sections 304 and 426 represent the furthest steps taken toward
a global approach to multinational insurance insolvencies. Moreover,
the United States, England, Canada and the European Community all
have spent years drafting and negotiating the terms of proposed agree-
ments intended to result in the adoption of a unified approach, though
to date their efforts have not yielded an acceptable agreement. Perhaps
the brightest prospect for successfully implementing a global approach
lies in the possibility of countries adopting legislation modeled after
Sections 304 and 426. It remains to be seen whether the goal of a mul-
tinational approach to insurance insolvencies can be attained. In the
interim, insurance company liquidators must resign themselves to con-
tinuing their search for a forum concursus.
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APPENDIX A
STATUTORY CROSS-BORDER INSURANCE INSOLVENCY
PROVISIONS
(United States and Territories)
STATE UILA3 27  NAIC MODEL ACT3 28  OTHER
Alabama 1943
Alaska 1966
Arizona 1954
Arkansas 1959
California 1988
Colorado 1955
Connecticut X
Delaware 1953
Florida 1959
Georgia 1961
Hawaii * X
Idaho X
Illinois 1941
Indiana X
Iowa X
Kansas X
Kentucky X
Louisiana 1948
Maine 1969
Maryland 1963
Massachusetts 1939
Michigan 1957
Minnesota X
Mississippi X
Missouri 1976
Montana * X
Nebraska X
Nevada 1971
12 Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (indicating date of substantial adoption of ma-
jor provisions).
3S' National Association of Insurance Commissioners Insurers Rehabilitation and
Liquidation Model Act (substantial adoption of major provisions).
* denotes that the state repealed the UILA and adopted the NAIC's Model Act.
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STATE
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virgin Islands
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
UILA NAIC MODEL ACT
X
1972
1953
1940
1957
1941
1958
1940
1969
1968
1947
1958
1967
* denotes that the state repealed the UILA and adopted the NAIC's Model Act.
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APPENDIX B
304. CASES ANCILLARY TO FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the
filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under this section by a
foreign representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a
party in interest does not timely controvert the petition, or after trial,
the court may -
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of -
(A) any action against -
(i) a debtor with respect to property
involved in such foreign proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgement against the
debtor with respect to such property, or any act or the commence-
ment or continuation of any judicial
proceeding to create or enforce a lien against the
property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of
such property, to such foreign representative or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of
this section, the court shall be guided by what will best assure an eco-
nomical and expeditious administration of such estate, consistent with -
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or
interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign
proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of prop-
erty of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accor-
dance with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start
for the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
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APPENDIX C
426. CO-OPERATION BETWEEN COURTS EXERCISING JURISDICTION IN
RELATION TO INSOLVENCY
(1) An order made by a court in any part of the United Kingdom
in the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law shall be en-
forced in any other part of the United Kingdom as if it were made by a
court exercising the corresponding jurisdiction in that other part.
(2) However, without prejudice,to the following provisions of this
section, nothing in subsection (1) requires a court in any part of the
United Kingdom to enforce, in relation to property situated in that
part, any order made by a court in any other part of the United
Kingdom.
(3) The Secretary of State, with the concurrence in relation to
property situated in England or Wales of the Lord Chancellor, may by
order make provision for securing that a trustee or assignee under the
insolvency law of any part of the United Kingdom has, with such modi-
fications as may be specified in the order, the same rights in relation to
any property situated in another part of the United Kingdom as he
would have in the corresponding circumstances if he were a trustee or
assignee under the insolvency law of that other part.
(4) The courts having jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law in
any part of the United Kingdom shall assist the courts having the cor-
responding jurisdiction in any other part of the United Kingdom or any
relevant country or territory.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) a request made to a court in
any part of the United Kingdom by a court in any other part of the
United Kingdom or in a relevant country or territory is authority for
the court to which the request is made to apply, in relation to any
matters specified in the request, the insolvency law which is applicable
by either court in relation to comparable matters falling within its
jurisdiction.
In exercising its discretion under this subsection, a court shall have
regard in particular to the rules of private international law.
(6) Where a person who is a trustee or assignee under the insol-
vency law of any part of the United Kingdom claims property situated
in any other part of the United Kingdom (whether by virtue of an
order under subsection (3) or otherwise), the submission of that claim
to the court exercising jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law in that
other part shall be treated in the same manner as a request made by a
court for the purpose of subsection (4).
(7) Section 38 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 (execution of war-
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rant of arrest throughout the United Kingdom) applies to a warrant
which, in exercise of any jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law, is
issued in any part of the United Kingdom for the arrest of a person as
it applies to a warrant issued in that part of the United Kingdom for
the arrest of a person charged with an offence.
(8) Without prejudice to any power to make rules of court, any
power to make provision by subordinate legislation for the purpose of
giving effect in relation to companies or individuals to the insolvency
law of any part of the United Kingdom includes power to make provi-
sions for the purpose of giving effect in that part to any provision made
by or under the preceding provisions of this section.
(9) An order under subsection (3) shall be made by statutory in-
strument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either
House of Parliament.
(10) In this section, "insolvency law" means -
(a) in relation to England and Wales, provision made by or under
this Act or sections 6 to 10, 12, 15, 19(c) and 20 (with Schedule 1) of
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and extending to
England and Wales;
(b) in relation to Scotland, provision extending to Scotland and
made by or under this Act, sections 6 to 10, 12, 15, 19(c) and 20 (with
Schedule 1) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, Part
XVIII of the Companies Act or the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985;
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, provision made by or under
the Bankruptcy Acts (Northern Ireland) 1857 to 1980, Part V, VI or
IX of the Companies Act (Northern Ireland) 1960 or Part IV of the
Companies (Northern Ireland) Order 1987;
(d) in relation to any relevant country or territory, so much of the
law of that country or territory as corresponds to provisions falling
within any of the foregoing paragraphs; and references in this subsec-
tion to any enactment include, in relation to any time before the coming
into force of that enactment the corresponding enactment in force at
that time.
(11) In this section "relevant country or territory" means -
(a) any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, or
(b) any country or territory designated for the purposes of this
section by the Secretary of State by order made by statutory instrument.
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